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I. INTRODUCTION
Until the Nixon Administration, federalism was not talked
about much in the United States in the post-New Deal period and was
not taken seriously as an intellectual matter. Increasingly, however,
federalism has become an important domestic' and a critical world-
wide issue. It may not be an exaggeration to say that federalism has
indeed become the pervasive legal/political issue around the world.
In this Article I will make four points. First, by way of back-
ground and overview, I will conclude that the goal of federalism is and
should be to encourage and facilitate geographically-based political
autonomy without placing at risk the interests of minorities within
those autonomous areas.
Second, I will examine federalism as a civil rights paradigm.
My thesis is that federalism, as a political principle and as an institu-
tional structure, is an important form of decentralization in decision
making in the cause of autonomy, democracy, and freedom. There is,
therefore, an essential complementarity between the principles of
federalism and traditional principles of civil rights. At the same time,
there is an inherent tension between those principles. The traditional
civil rights paradigm protects individual liberties by resort to univer-
salistic principles such as equal treatment regardless of race, religion,
or gender. Federalism may protect minorities based not on universal-
1. During the Reagan and Bush administrations, federalism became an important do-
mestic ideological agenda issue. During the Reagan Administration, a Justice Department-
based interagency task force (The Working Group on Federalism), under the leadership of
Charles Cooper, Assistant Attorney General (Office of Legal Counsel), recommended that
federal policy be more sensitive to federalism concerns. As a result of the work of that task
force, an executive order directing executive departments and agencies to adhere to principles of
federalism was subsequently promulgated, Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. § 252 (1988), and
its implementation was taken seriously. When I was nominated in 1990 as Administrator of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget,
which had administrative oversight responsibility for enforcing Executive Order 12,612, I was
struck by how seriously the OIRA office staff-the civil servants in that office-regarded the
federalism questions that surrounded substantive policy initiatives of the federal agencies.
There was a determination at OIRA and at the Department of Justice to allow states the
freedom to do things that officials of the Bush Administration believed to be misguided.
Apparently, the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded
that the federalism executive order was "given perfunctory treatment" by the line federal
agencies charged with its initial implementation, U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Regulation of State and Local Governments: The Mixed
Record of the 1980s 35 (1993), and "failed to produce the significant changes in federal agency
decision making expected by most state and local government officials." Id. at 2.
2. See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 332 (1994); J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L. J. 2403 (1991).
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istic norms, but upon ascriptive criteria such as geography or ethnic-
ity.
Through political structure and the allocation of political
authority, federalism seeks to empower geographically-based minori-
ties in a political manner. This political empowerment insulates, to
some extent, geographically-based minorities from political subordi-
nation at the hands of majoritarian national constituencies and insti-
tutions. Through use of the legal/constitutional process, traditional
principles of civil rights seek to protect categorically-defined minori-
ties, by use of the legal/judicial system, from the potential tyranny of
the political majority.3
As mentioned, while there is an essential complementarity
between the politically-based principles of federalism and legally-
based principles of civil rights, there also is an inherent tension.
Federalism is group-oriented. It is also geographically-based. And it
protects the interests in political hegemony of the majorities among
those geographically-based groups. In that sense, it is a tool for rede-
fining in a jurisdictional sense the scope of majoritarian control at a
sub-national level. That group focus, which often is associated with
empowerment of a particular regional group through a majoritarian
sub-national process and structure, is in tension with the traditional
civil rights focus on an individual's right to be liberated from majori-
tarian control.
Third, I will show that there is a threat to federalism from
expanding federal power. The "federalism deal," as I will call it, em-
powers local communities, but part of the deal is also that local power
with regard to civil rights issues be constrained.4 The requirement of
national protection and national control of civil rights, however, can
undermine the legal foundation of federalism; I will argue that that
has occurred in the United States. This suggests the need for af-
firmative protection of federalism vis-a-vis national power in other
areas where national interests are more attenuated.
In this country's post-New Deal constitutional history, the
scope of federal power has expanded dramatically, typically under
expansive Supreme Court interpretations of the commerce power.5
3. For discussion of transforming traditional civil rights protections into a political
framework, see Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in
Representative Democracy (Free, 1994).
4. For further elaboration of these themes, see Federalist No. 9 (Hamilton) in Clinton
Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 71 (Mentor, 1961); Federalist No. 10 (Madison) in Rossiter,
ed., The Federalist Papers 77.
5. See, for example, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Commerce Clause, part of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
1994] 1253
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This expansion has undermined the original assumption of the
constitutional framers regarding a federal government of enumerated
and delimited powers. Expansive federal power under the Commerce
Clause has shifted the scope of federal power from limited to plenary.
Initially, two types of issues were confronted when the federal
government purported to exercise authority: (1) whether an ap-
propriate source of authority existed that warranted the exercise of
federal authority; and (2) whether the exercise of federal authority
violated some affirmative limitation on the exercise of federal gov-
ernmental power. The expansive interpretation of the reach of federal
power under the Commerce Clause has meant that reliance on the
lack of a constitutionally-based source of authority as a limit on fed-
eral power has not proven to be a workable means of limiting federal
power. Only the existence of affirmative limitations-for example,
the Bill of Rights-has restrained the scope of governmental
authority. Some form of affirmative constraint on federal
authority-an institutional design akin to the Bill of Rights
paradigm-is probably necessary to give substantive effect to the
fundamental precepts of federalism.
Fourth, I will examine how this broad framework fits the
American experience. In this regard I will consider Gregory v.
Ashcroft,6 a post-Garcia 7 case that adopted the "plain statement" rule
as a vehicle of statutory interpretation for limiting the application of
federal law to the states. I also will discuss New York v. United
States,8 which ruled on Tenth Amendment grounds that the federal
government cannot force a state to implement a federal policy as state
law. In addition, I will consider, in a paradigmatic context, two other
doctrines, one statutory9 and one common law,10 that establish
affirmative limits on the scope of federal power. For example, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act basically vests regulatory authority for
insurance issues in the states. The Supreme Court has interpreted
McCarran-Fergson as eliminating any dormant Commerce Clause
claims against state regulation of insurance," even in the context of
reads: "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
6. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
7. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
8. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
9. The statutory example is the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988),
which conferred on states regulatory and taxing authority with regard to the business of
insurance.
10. See, for example, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
11. See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451
U.S. 648 (1981).
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facial discrimination against interstate commerce. 12 In a real sense,
then, the McCarran-Ferguson Act can be viewed as an anti-
supremacy clause provision, an act of federal self-abnegation in which
Congress renounces federal authority and statutorily establishes a
defined area of state political/jurisdictional hegemony. 3
Similarly, the so-called state action antitrust doctrine origi-
nally announced in Parker v. Brown'4 establishes through common
law an institutionalized respect for federalism values by creating a
state-based affirmative limit on the scope of the federal antitrust
laws. Parker confers on the states permanent authority to counter-
mand federal antitrust policies in areas of state choosing. This
authority takes the form of immunity for the states themselves, but it
is not so limited. The doctrine has been construed to authorize states
to confer antitrust immunity on private actors as well,15 provided that
the state clearly articulates a policy to substitute regulation for com-
petition and actively supervises the private actor's implementation of
that state policy. 6 The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Parker doc-
trine provide important paradigms of affirmative, self-imposed7 imi-
tations placed on the scope of federal power.
12. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
13. Historically, Congress' willingness to have states regulate insurance accounted for the
origin of the McCarran-Ferguson legislation. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the Supreme Court had held that the business of insurance was
interstate commerce and therefore subject to the strictures of the negative Commerce Clause.
This ruling also indicated that federal regulation would be sustained. McCarran-Ferguson's
enactment was a step of federal self-restraint, delegating these issues to state authorities. See
generally notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
A constitutional parallel was the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition.
States were explicitly authorized to regulate liquor, and the scope of federal power was thereby
circumscribed by an express conferral of authority on states. Section 2 provides: "The transpor-
tation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S.
Const., Amend. XXI, § 2.
14. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
15. See, for example, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48 (1985).
16. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
17. These limitations are self-imposed in that the federal government has authority to
legislate but, in the exercise of that authority, chooses to re-allocate that power to the states.
The early liquor prohibition experience, in which the Supreme Court disallowed a state ban on
the importation of alcoholic beverages but validated such a ban after authorizing federal legis-
lation, is useful as an example of this type of federal role. Compare Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S.
100 (1890) (invalidating, in absence of federal legislation, a state ban on the sale of beer
imported from another state), with In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (upholding state
prohibition laws, when authorized by federal statute, as applied to liquor shipped in interstate
commerce).
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERALISM AND THE FEDERALISM DEAL
The break-up of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of
Independent States and Yugoslavia's painful and prolonged self-de-
struction are good examples of the point that federalism is perhaps
the overarching worldwide legal/political issue of the '90s. The thrust
for autonomy in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the peaceful
break-up of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia
exemplify the problems and consequences of unsuccessful nation-
states that have failed to solve the challenges of federalism. An impe-
tus toward self-determination and independence or secession, to use
the term with a poignant American connotation, is a natural and pre-
dictable outcome of a failed federalism.
In the face of geographically-based ethnic or religious regional
tensions, self-determination and independence reflect an alternative
to a successful pluralistic accommodation within the framework of a
nation-state. Principles of federalism are designed to reflect and
accommodate these tensions within a broader polity. Nationalism
that results in the formation of new, smaller nation-states is a re-
sponse to a national entity that does not give adequate recognition or
self-governing autonomy to local or regional interests. That fragmen-
tation is of particular concern when those local or regional separation-
ist interests do not coincide with prevalent patterns of political power
in the nation-state as a whole. In short, the sovereignty solution,
which is reflected in the movement toward self-determination and
independence, is often a manifestation of a more fundamental fail-
ure-the promise of limited sovereignty within a pluralistic nation-
state has inadequately protected quasi-nationalistic claims of auton-
omy by geographically identifiable minority groups.'8
18. Viewed in this way, federalism is an ascriptive principle at odds with traditional
democratic norms of universalism. In giving vent to geographically-based feelings of quasi-
nationalism, federalism recognizes that interests among groups diverge. The focus is away from
the individual and toward the group. That sense of group cohesiveness breaches traditional
democratic universalistic norms. Those norms place emphasis on transcendent values attaching
to personhood, not to ascriptive criteria such as membership in a particular group.
In turn, the communitarian or tribal nature of localism raises a legitimate concern about the
treatment of minorities within the autonomous local area. Group-oriented conduct can result in
exclusion of those who do not share group characteristics. This rights-oriented concern is
typically voiced in universalistic terms--for example, opposition to discrimination based on
certain traits, such as race, religion, or gender. Thus, while the objectives of the federalism
paradigm and the civil rights paradigm have much in common, their implementation strategies
are in considerable tension. It is this ascriptive or tribal dimension to federalism that often has
led universalists toward unsympathetic stances regarding federalism.
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The formation of new nation-states has its own set of prob-
lems. Newly independent states can face significant economic obsta-
cles. For example, when Bangladesh split off from Pakistan, it was
widely viewed as an economic basket case. It still has one of the low-
est per capita GNPs in the world.19
New nations create problems of trade, fragmentation of mar-
kets, and administrative inefficiencies. The lack of trade barriers and
the availability of a large market for the purchase and sale of goods
and services have contributed to the success of the American common
market experiment 2° now being emulated in Western Europe.21
Administratively, the break-up of nation-states can be costly because
of the loss of economies of scale for such things as national defense
and governmental and economic infrastructure. Independence can
necessitate inefficient and excessive expenditures on national defense
and can result, as in Bosnia, in increased nationalistic tensions which
enhance the need for even greater levels of military expenditures.
New nations, exercising autonomy, also pose human rights
risks. Balkan scholar Robert Kaplan recently put it this way: "Self-
determination is only a good deal if your group happens to be in the
majority.112 2 That is, as independence or secession transfers political
power, new risks to freedom and liberty come into existence.23 New
19. In 1992, Bangladesh had a per capita GNP estimated at $220 U.S. dollars, one of the
lowest in the world. The World Bank, The World Bank Atlas 1994 18 (1994). See also The
Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Backgrounder: Updated World Development Indicators
(June 19, 1994) (naming Bangladesh as one of the ten poorest countries in the world based on
1992 per capita GNP).
20. For a particularly eloquent statement of this point, see H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
21. The need for taking seriously "[tihe notion that action should be taken at the lowest
level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be achieved" is also an impor-
tent factor in forging supra-national entities that seek to take advantage of the benefits of
larger economic and political marketplaces. Bermann, 94 Colum L. Rev. at 338 (cited in note 2).
See id. at 338-44.
22. See Georgie Anne Geyer, Self-determination Sees 1 Ethnic Group Oppress Another,
Often Violently, Nashville Banner 9 (January 26, 1994).
23. James Madison recognized that an important source of friction and injustice was what
he described as "the mischiefs of faction." Federalist No. 10 (Madison) at 78 (cited in note 4).
Madison defined "faction" as a group of citizens "united and actuated by some common impulse
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggre-
gate interests of the community." Id. Madison expressed concern about local tyranny by
entrenched factions. "The smaller the society,... the more frequently will a majority be found
of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a mjority,... the
more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression." Id. at 83.
Madison was pessimistic about the possibility of removing the causes of faction and instead
sought out "means of controlling its effects." Id. at 80 (emphasis deleted). He argued that, by
extending the political community beyond the confines of a particular state, a nation-state
makes it "less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or... to act in unison with each other" Id. at 83. Thus, Madison fully
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groups of minorities are subject to local laws and potentially to local-
ized tyranny. The absence of recourse by these new groups of minori-
ties to national institutions or to a nationally enforced rule of law is a
critical drawback of the political movement toward self-determination
and the creation of new mini-states.24 Resort to the international
community for human rights protections is theoretically available as
an alternative to recourse to pluralistic nation-states, but interna-
tional institutions for the protection of human rights are notoriously
ineffective and not much to be trusted in Bosnia, Cambodia, Somalia,
Rwanda, or elsewhere.
In the American case, secession by the states of the
Confederacy risked even greater oppression for blacks without the
potential restraining influence of, appeal to, and recourse from a
national constituency. We can gain important lessons in this regard
from our own national experience-the Revolution, the Articles of
Confederation, ratification of the Constitution, the Civil War, and the
modern civil rights movement-and from experiences elsewhere. It is
useful to draw on some of these lessons.
Strong national institutions are important for economic pro-
gress and national security, and, under democracy, to reassure vari-
ous geographic and other minorities of basic human rights.25
Independence and self-determination movements result from cen-
trifugal forces stemming from unresolved geographically and ethni-
cally-based claims and grievances against central majority-driven
institutions. Independence and self-determination can lead to a pro-
liferation of mini-states, as we have seen around the world, and to the
reversal of nineteenth-century trends toward the development of
nation states. This results in economic inefficiency and threats to
human rights.
understood the risk to liberty from excessive decentralization through the formation of mini-
states; he saw the nation-state as an antidote, a safeguard to the risks of majoritarian tyranny
in local decision-making units. Compare with Clint Bolick, Grass Roots Tyranny: The Limits of
Federalism 39 (Cato Institute, 1993) (stating that the "occasional tendency of states to succumb
to majoritarian tyranny was one of the motivations to create a stronger national government"
with adequate powers to protect individual liberty).
24. In supporting the ratification of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton
in the Federalist Papers argued that "[a] firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace
and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection." Federalist No.
9 (Hamilton) at 71 (cited in note 4). Hamilton saw an important value of Union in the ability of
the nation to protect against political oppression and abuses in the states-that is, "the ten-
dency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection." Id. at 75. See generally id. at
71; Federalist No. 10 (Madison) at 77 (cited in note 4).
25. See generally Bolick, Grass Roots Tyranny at 178-83 (cited in note 23).
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Thus, developing successful regimes of federalism is an impor-
tant goal.26 This requires sensitivity to geographically-based sub-
national majorities when those majorities are out of sync with na-
tional majorities.27 The goal, as indicated earlier, is to encourage
geographically-based political autonomy without placing at risk the
interests of political, racial, religious, or ethnic minorities within
those quasi-autonomous areas.28  This strategic linkage of
federalism-to protect subnational political autonomy-with
nationally enforced norms of civil rights-to enforce principles of
nondiscrimination based on race, religion, and gender-is what I call
the "federalism deal."
III. FEDERALISM AS A CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM
I now focus on federalism as a civil rights paradigm.
Federalism as a political principle and as an institutional structure is
an important form of decentralization in the cause of autonomy, de-
mocracy, and freedom. 29 In this regard, there is an essential comple-
mentarity between the principles of federalism and traditional princi-
ples of civil rights. At the same time, there is also an inherent ten-
sion between those norms. The traditional civil rights paradigm pro-
tects individual liberties by resort to universalistic principles such as
equal treatment regardless of race, religion, or gender. Federalism
may protect minorities, but its mode of protection is not based on an
embrace of universalistic norms-which is the approach of the civil
rights paradigm-but upon ascriptive criteria such as geography or
ethnicity.
26. For an argument that similar values (subsidiarity) are important as part of the struc-
ture of the European Community, see Bermann, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 338-66 (cited in note 2).
27. Daniel Elazar, who has written extensively on federalism, says that "[ilt is rather like
wanting to have one's cake and eat it too." Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism 33 (U. of
Ala., 1987). That is, "[f]ederalism has to do with the need of people and polities to unite for
common purposes yet remain separate to preserve their respective integrities." Id.
28. See generally Bolick, Grass Roots Tyranny at 42 (cited in note 23) (stating that the
goal of the Framers was "to accommodate three disparate and often competing goals: creating a
national government with powers sufficient to govern; preserving to the greatest possible
extent the powers of state governments; and protecting individual liberty").
29. "Federalism can be defined as the mode of political organization that unites separate
polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and con-
stituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both."
Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States 2 (Harper & Row, 3d ed. 1984).
1994] 1259
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A. The Nature of Federalism
Federalism lrovides a vehicle for allowing geographically
defined constituencies, especially geographically defined minorities, to
have a measure of self-rule within the political framework of a
broader nation-state. Federalism responds to very real majoritarian
tensions in pluralistic societies. It serves as a tool for assuring
limited self-government to a geographically-based minority group. It
is an accommodation to such a group whose political interests might
be persistently submerged if all political decisions were to be made at
the national level using the model of a unitary nation-state.
Understood in this way, federalism is a means for preserving
majoritarian political processes in subnational areas. It is a way of
assuring political minorities that they will control their everyday lives
without pushing them to independence or secession. That is, federal-
ism preserves the nation-state but allows the regions to operate on
their own to some degree. And, of course, that's the rub-to what
degree?30
Federalism is a compromise. Unlike structures such as the
unitary state model, in which power is centralized, a federalist struc-
ture limits central power but also asserts national hegemony over
local interests where national interests override.
Federalism is thus a rights-conferring doctrine. But the rights
conferred are geographically-based in nature. They are institutional
in that they relate to political structure and jurisdiction and to the
allocation of political power between or among different units of gov-
ernment. Of perhaps greatest significance, the rights conferred
through federalism are typically group-based-that is, they are often
linked to the autonomy of a regionally-based group or set of groups
within a larger political structure. But within the decentralized unit,
the comnitment to majoritarianism remains intact. Indeed, at the
subnational level, majoritarianism is the tool of empowerment of the
regional group or set of groups.
The individual rights-oriented set of values that we associate
with our Bill of Rights can be viewed as countermajoritarian in char-
acter. It is premised on the existence of pluralism and the desirability
of protecting that pluralism from the tyranny of fleeting majority
sentiment. The civil rights paradigm is designed to insulate minori-
ties from unfettered majoritarianism, which can be manifested in its
30. For a description of varying forms of federal structures, see Elazar, Exploring
Federalism at 38-64 (cited in note 27).
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extreme form as nationalism or, some would say, tribalism. Thus,
while federalism shares with the civil rights paradigm a concern with
unrestrained majoritarianism at the national level, its tenets and
underlying assumptions are in considerable tension with the tradi-
tional universalistic principles of a rights-based, pluralistic, counter-
majoritarian legal regime.
Federalism recognizes and gives succor to different views and
different values that characterize geographically-defined groups. It
shields from unconstrained majoritarianism, but its technique is po-
litical and group-focused--oftentimes single-group focused. Civil
rights principles are similarly aimed at guarding against rampant
majoritarianism, but the technique of protection is legal and univer-
salistic in character and individual-rights focused-embracing a plu-
ralistic vision.
Federalism protects group political interests of majoritarian
control. Under federalism, local political majorities and their priori-
ties prevail even when on a national scale the locally empowered
group would be outvoted. This suggests that the local polity or politi-
cal entity may choose a different balance between majoritarian inter-
ests on the one hand and individual rights on the other. For example,
a state might choose to require its judges to retire at a certain age
despite general federal anti-age-discrimination legislation that would
strike a different balance between the values of non-discrimination
based on age and the desirability of mandatory retirement.31
Thus, the group rights model of federalism can bump into an
individual rights model. Local autonomy can lead to group oppression
of insular political minorities within the local territorial area. Local
passions and prejudices can result in the denial of liberty through the
empowerment and hegemony of geographically-based regional fac-
tions. This highlights the tension that arises when a national gov-
ernment delegates majoritarian control to a decentralized constitu-
ency, and that localized delegated power is exercised in a way that
cuts against the political culture of the national majority. The na-
tional constituency has a strong claim for taking measures aimed at
preserving bona fide national economic interests. As part of the fed-
eralism deal that provides for political power delegation, the national
government also has a strong interest in restricting discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, and gender within a state.
31. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473.
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B. Federalism and Civil Rights: Voting Rights as a Case Study
The voting rights area is worthy of some discussion because it
provides a good example of: (1) the elements of the federalism deal;
and (2) the tensions between the federalism and the civil rights para-
digms.
1. Voting Rights as Part of the Federalism Deal
Race discrimination in voting was made expressly unconstitu-
tional in the post-Civil War period by the Fifteenth Amendment.3 2
Yet, "in 1965, 95 years after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment
extended the right to vote to all citizens regardless of race or color,
Congress found that racial discrimination in voting was an 'insidious
and pervasive evil which has been perpetuated in certain parts of our
country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the
Constitution. '33 The Voting Rights Act of 196534 reflected a "strong
commitment to the nondiscrimination principle in voting" and was an
effort "to root out sophisticated as well as overt discrimination. '35
The Voting Rights Act has been acclaimed as "the most effec-
tive tool for protecting the right to vote,"36 and as the "most important
legislation in the Nation's history relating to voting rights."37 It was
"primarily designed as a remedial device to overcome a history of
obstructionist resistance to the enfranchisement of blacks"38 and was
born out of the "conviction that aggressive enforcement [of minority
voting rights] is a proper function of the federal government. ' 9
Under Section 5, a jurisdiction with a history of racial dis-
crimination (a "covered jurisdiction") 4° may not change any "standard,
32. The Fifteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: 'The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. Const. Amend. XV.
33. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 181-82 (1980) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966)).
34. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et
seq. (1988 & Supp. 1992).
35. See James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on
the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. 633, 637 (1983).
36. H.R. Rep. No. 227, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1982).
37. Staff of Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., Report on S. 1992, 20-21 (Comm. Print 1982).
38. See Blumstein, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 677 (cited in note 35).
39. Id. at 678.
40. "Section 4, [42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)], established the mechanism for determining
which states or subunits of a state" were to be covered by the "special remedial provisions of the
Act" contained in Section 5. Id. & n.217 (cited in note 35).
1262 [Vol. 47:1251
1994] FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1263
practice, or procedure with respect to voting' 41 without preclearance
by the United States Attorney General or by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The burden of demon-
strating compliance with Section 5 rests with the covered jurisdic-
tion.42  "In essence, the preclearance technique freezes the political
environment as of a specific date. '43 The underlying assumption of
the freezing principle was that, given the historical pattern of disen-
franchisement, 44 some independent review of voting changes was
necessary as a "prophylactic measure 45 to guarantee that "old devices
for disenfranchisement [will] not.., be replaced by new ones."46
The federalism implications of the Voting Rights Act are sub-
stantial. Covered states and covered subdivisions of states are unable
to make electoral changes without approval by the federal govern-
ment, and the burden of proof lies with the petitioning jurisdiction.
Although the provisions of Section 5 were originally set to expire at
the end of five years in 1970, the preclearance procedure has been
extended to 2007.47 Critics of the preclearance provisions of Section 5
such as Justice Black argued that "covered jurisdictions" were treated
as "little more than conquered provinces."'48
From a federalism perspective, the preclearance mechanism is
surely stiff medicine. In 1965, when the preclearance review proce-
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. While the coverage of Section 5, and thus the preclearance
procedures, expressly applied only to a new prerequisite, standard, or procedure regarding
voting, the Supreme Court has extended the coverage beyond the registration and voting
process to encompass the entire electoral process, including "any state enactment which altered
the election law of a covered [jurisdiction] in even a minor way." Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969). See also Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) (holding legis-
lative reapportionment subject to preclearance); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971)
(holding annexations subject to preclearance).
42. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976). In Beer, the Supreme Court
held that the standard governing preclearance was the "nonretrogression principle"-that is,
the goal of Section 5 was "to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise
of the electoral franchise." Id. at 141. The Court rejected the view expressed in dissent by
Justice White that Section 5 required that districts be drawn, to the extent practicable, to afford
minorities an opportunity to achieve roughly proportional representation. Id. at 143-44 (White,
J., dissenting). For an argument that the Justice Department has largely ignored the Beer
standard and instead has applied in preclearance proceedings the standard that Justice White
advocated in his Beer dissent, see Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Affirmative
Action and Minority Voting Rights 173 (Harvard U., 1987) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court's
test for discriminatory effect [nonretrogression] is often simply openly ignored"). See also id. at
143-44, 151, 157-91.
43. See Blumstein, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 679 (cited in note 35).
44. See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
45. See Blumstein, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 679 (cited in note 35).
46. See S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CA.N. 177.
47. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. (1988).
48. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting).
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dure was enacted, there was a documented disenfranchisement prob-
lem of major proportions, which the Supreme Court referenced in
upholding the validity of the Voting Rights Act.49 When up for re-
newal in 1982, Section 5 was extended for a period of twenty-five
years based on Congressional belief that the problems of disenfran-
chisment and vote dilution were still present in the covered jurisdic-
tions. In the face of such findings, even stiff medicine such as Section
5 is warranted under the federalism deal to assure fair access to the
franchise and nondiscriminatory electoral and representational prac-
tices.50 It is a legitimate and important national interest, as part of
the successful federalism deal, to assure nondiscrimination on the
basis of race in the electoral process. Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act provides an example of strong federal intervention, in tension
with principles of state autonomy, in the name of civil rights protec-
tion. But such intervention is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of
the system,51 to protect against unconstitutional racial discrimination,
and to maintain the integrity of the federalism deal.
Enforcement of the preclearance procedures and nonretrogres-
sion principles of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act illustrates the
tension between the elements of the federalism deal. On the one
hand, it demdnstrates the important role that aggressive civil rights
enforcement can play in making good on the federalism deal, safe-
guarding nondiscrimination, and providing, through national institu-
tions, recourse for discrimination at the subnational level. On the
other hand, federal enforcement of principles of nondiscrimination in
voting constrains and thereby impinges to some degree on the auton-
omy of states to establish their own electoral processes and struc-
tures.
49. See id. at 308-15.
50. On the "substantive meaning [of Section 5] apart from its prophylactic role of protect-
ig against hard-to-detect discriminatory conduct," see Blumstein, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 687-88, &
n.269 (cited in note 35). See also Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 236 (cited in note 42)
(approving Section 5 review to guard against purposeful discrimination and against "backsliding
- attempts to undermine the effectiveness of... enfranchisement...').
51. Voting has been labeled a fundamental interest, see Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969), because it is "preservative of all rights." See ick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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2. The Tensions Between the Federalism and Civil Rights
Paradigms: Voting Rights as an Example
Racial gerrymander52 and vote dilution litigation53 provide an
example of another tension-between different approaches toward
protecting the interests of citizens within a state, between principles
underlying federalism and those undergirding traditional civil rights
protections.
Principles of federalism have a certain common ground with
our tradition of geographic districting for legislative elections, which
allows a geographically-defined area to elect a representative of its
own to a political body. Establishing a legislative district is a way of
providing representation in governance to political interests that
might otherwise be submerged if winner-take-all at-large elections
were the norm. Geographic legislative districting assures residents of
that region of majoritarian empowerment within their own defined
yet delimited piece of the legislative world.54
Geographic legislative districting, especially at the local level,
reflects a balancing among values. So-called "good government" crit-
ics of geographic districting, particularly in local governments, have
argued that such geographically elected representatives have a paro-
chial perspective because of their dependence for re-election on only a
small component of the entire constituency. These representatives, so
the argument goes, should have an orientation that is focused on the
entire community. That broader, more inclusive community-wide
perspective can only come if representatives are accountable to the
total community. That, in turn, would suggest a shift from a district-
based system of representation to an at-large approach.55
The at-large system has come under fire because it allows a
single constituency to determine the outcome of all elections within a
local government. The relevant "community" is a majority of the en-
tire community, and that group, if politically cohesive (a "faction"),56
52. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993).
53. This can occur under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, see Johnson v.
De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2651 (1994), or under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
54. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982).
55. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 n.15 (1980) (stating that "[i]t is noteworthy that
a system of at-large city elections in place of elections of city officials by the voters of small
geographic wards was universally heralded not many years ago as a praiseworthy and progres-
sive reform of corrupt municipal government").
56. See note 23.
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can tyrannize the minority, with minority voters receiving very little
or no voice within the counsels of government.57
This tension between the desire for a community-wide perspec-
tive and the desire to provide some basis for sharing political power
intensifies the importance of the criteria used in district line-drawing.
If districts are composed of politically coherent majorities out of sync
with the broader community, they can exacerbate the centrifugal
impetus of factionalism. District representatives must sit in a delib-
erative body and participate in the deliberative legislative process;
overall stability is advanced to the extent that these representatives
must seek political support from a coalition of political elements
within their districts. Nonresidents of a district have some hope for
influence when a representative must stand for re-election in a com-
petitive constituency that might comprise "interest surrogates" for
nonresidents who are potentially affected by legislative decisions
within a jurisdiction of which that district is a part.8
The policy agenda of some advocates for minority voting rights
in the United States would seek a politically assured district drawn
along race-conscious lines.59 Although not commonly defended on this
basis, these efforts may have some common ground with the underly-
ing rationale of federalism. The goal seems to be to vouchsafe for the
minority community a piece of the political action by guaranteeing the
ability of the minority community to elect its preferred candidate.
Much voting rights advocacy and scholarship now is designed to
achieve for an identified minority the type of political assurances that
geographically-based groups receive under federalism.6O
The debate that has swirled around the desirability and pro-
priety of consciously establishing districts controlled by minority
voters (or similar surrogates to replicate those structures, such as
cumulative voting) reflects the tensions between the federalism and
civil rights paradigms. Professor Lani Guinier has described 'three
generations of voting rights issues."61 The first focuses on ballot ac-
cess issues; the second "aims to create majority black single-member
57. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 616 (stating that "[alt-large voting schemes ...tend to
minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all
representatives of the district. A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or
political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election!).
58. James Madison saw a risk of oppression in small homogeneous groupings that were
under the control of a faction. See note 23.
59. For a brief description of the assumptions underlying this strategy, see Lani Guinier,
The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1135, 1151-52 (1993).
60. See generally Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (cited in note 3).
61. See Guinier, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1151 (cited in note 59).
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districts"; and the third focuses on "meaningful black participation in
governance. ' 2 What has shifted between the first and second stages
is a redefinition of the objectives. It is not a progression along a sin-
gle continuum, but rather a fundamental change in concept and strat-
egy-that is, a shift in paradigms.
Access to the ballot through enforcement of the nondiscrimina-
tion guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is con-
sistent with a civil rights approach. It emphasizes individual claims
of injustice based on universalistic principles of racial nondiscrimina-
tion, and it uses legal/constitutional claims of countermajoritarian
rights for protection from discriminatory majoritarian practices estab-
lished by subnational governments.
Dissatisfaction with the results of nondiscriminatory proc-
esses, traditionally viewed, has led some advocates to seek out minor-
ity control over districts, and has led to questioning whether the dis-
trict itself is an appropriate unit in which to express the political
interests of racial minorities.0 The focus of analysis has shifted to the
kinds of group-based and structural concerns that underlie federal-
ism, and away from the kinds of universalistic considerations custom-
arily associated with the civil rights paradigm.
For example, Professor Guinier has advocated the objective of
"proportionate interest representation"" as the appropriate goal of
voting rights proponents. Her rationale is that "[i]nterests are those
self-identified voluntary constituencies who choose to combine be-
cause of like minds.65 Professor Guinier is dissatisfied with geo-
graphically-based constituencies because they do not provide an ade-
quate vehicle for the combining of like-minded political voices.
Whether voting rights advocates seek their form of empower-
ment through consciously black-controlled districts or through non-
geographic institutional structures that assure representation of
group interests, the paradigm would appear to be the same. It is one
of group autonomy and empowerment-principles ostensibly underly-
ing federalism but without geographical constraint, and disconnected
from the critical federalism principle of self-governance, because
legislative representation contemplates participation in a pluralistic,
deliberative body.66
62. Id. at 1151-53.
63. Id. at 1153-63.
64. Id. at 1140.
65. Id.
66. A legislative district representative must function within and as part of a deliberative
body. The transfer of "faction" from the voting population to representation in the political
12671994]
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And, of course, the same tensions exist between these group
empowerment proposals for legislative representation and traditional
civil rights virtues-is this the exaltation of faction at the expense of
universalistic criteria of nondiscrimination? Should the principles of
autonomy and kinship that characterize federalism be expanded to
accommodate racial group interests, even at the expense of traditional
principles of racial nondiscrimination? Is the revised voting rights
agenda a proper case of doctrinal adaptation, or a case of an inappro-
priately matched intellectual transplant-a paradigm mistake?
In a fundamental way, those were the issues fought out in the
pivotal Supreme Court decision in Shaw v. Reno,67 the North Carolina
racial gerrymander case. In redistricting, the state consciously drew
two black-majority districts. That action reflected the views that a
majority-minority district was necessary for black empowerment.
This is a manifestation of the group and kinship model, which holds
that legislators should represent discrete interests without the need
to be politically responsive to a pluralistic constituency. Because of
the obvious racial basis for the weirdly drawn districts under chal-
lenge, the question was whether plaintiffs could state a traditional
Equal Protection claim based on race discrimination.69 The majority
said yes, the dissenters said no.
The Shaw majority insisted that the case was like any other
race-based districting case. Although it is true that no individual has
any legally cognizable claim to reside in any particular legislative
district,70 it is also true that nobody can be assigned to a particular
district on account of race in the absence of the government's satisfy-
ing the strictest standard of scrutiny reserved for race classifica-
tions. 71 No schoolchild involved in Brown v. Board of
chamber can exacerbate the significance of faction rather than, as Madison urged, see note 23,
diminishing its significance.
67. 113 S. Ct. 2816.
68. This apparently wa the view of the Justice Department, which denied preclearance to
an earlier plan that provided for a single black-majority district. Id. at 2820. For a somewhat
different perspective on the issue of black representation of black interests, see Carol M. Swain,
Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress (Harvard,
1993).
69. See, for example, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hos. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
70. See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977).
71. Specifically, the Court stated:
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. They
reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should
be judged by the color of their skin .... Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial
purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us
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Education72 had a legally cognizable interest in being
placed in any particular school, but the State could not
classify schoolchildren into districts based on race. So it
was in Shaw regarding legislative districts.
The Shaw dissenters would have dismissed the claim-thereby
not requiring any state justification-because of a lack of showing of
"discriminatory effects," even in the face of a showing of discrimina-
tory intent.73 For the dissenters, "[w]hen... the creation of a major-
ity-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of
any other group," there is no Constitutional violation74 Whereas the
majority recognized an individual's claim of race discrimination as
"analytically distinct" from a group-based claim of vote dilution,75 the
dissent was unwilling to accept the relevance of the traditional indi-
vidual rights paradigm in a legislative districting situation.
What Shaw reflects is the competing constitutional visions
that govern the electoral process. The majority found the traditional
civil rights paradigm controlling. The Court had previously, in
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,76 established the principle of racial
reciprocity-that all state-imposed racial classifications are suspect
and subject to strict scrutiny, irrespective of which race is disadvan-
taged.7 7 Consequently, all "state legislation that expressly distin-
guishes among citizens because of their race [must] be narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling governmental interest."' 8 Race cannot be
used, under traditional civil rights principles of strict scrutiny, as a
proxy for a common group-based viewpoint 79 because such a proxy
perpetuates "impermissible racial stereotypes" and "reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their
further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues
to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures
demands closejudicial scrutiny.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2842.
75. Id. at 2830.
76. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
77. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion) (stating that express racial classifications are suspect
because "[aibsent searching judicial inquiry... there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by Me-
gitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics"); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
78. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
79. But compare Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying




age, education, economic status, or the community in which they
live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls. ' 0
It is apparent that the civil rights approach of Shawl" is fun-
damentally at odds with the racial group and kinship model advo-
cated by some voting rights commentators. For the dissenters in
Shaw, the civil rights paradigm had no independent application to the
legislative districting context. If government chose to district by
using race as just another ethnic group in a political gerrymander,
then the civil rights approach of Brown v. Board of Education82 had no
application. The dissenters would have found that a cause of action
exists only if the political influence of a racial group is "unduly dimin-
ish[ed]."83
Thus, the majority and the dissent in Shaw directly address
the competing analytical paradigms. For the majority, a claim of race
discrimination can be established in a legislative districting case.
Racial gerrymanders are not just any garden variety of districting.
Principles of racial nondiscrimination circumscribe governmental
power to give effect to race-based group and kinship interests. For
the dissent, state governments have more autonomy to accommodate
race-based group interests. The Shaw majority, committed to the
principle of racial reciprocity, saw the federalism deal as encompass-
ing an obligation to police the use of race by state governments. This
reflected the national commitment to enforce norms of racial nondis-
crimination against state violation. The Shaw dissenters were pre-
pared to defer to the state government the authority to use race-based
80. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
81. The Shaw majority purported to leave open the question whether the principles
announced in the case and the analysis of the issues in that case were limited in their applica-
tion to weird districts, "express[ing] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-
minority districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal protection claim." Id. at 2828
(quoting id. at 2839) (White, J., dissenting). Despite Justice White's belief that the "case cannot
stand for the proposition that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without
more, gives rise to an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment," id., it is
hard to give intellectual coherence to the majority opinion otherwise. The weird district was
deemed evidence of purposeful racial classification. If purposeful racial classification is estab-
lished in other ways, it seems apparent that the strict scrutiny requirement must stand. And,
given the Croson principle of racial reciprocity, see note 77 and accompanying text, it would
seem logically to follow that all a challenger need show to establish a racial classification and
demand scrutiny is that race was a motivating factor. Defendants would then have the burden
of establishing as an affirmative defense, that race was not the dispositive factor in the decision
making process. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270-71 n.21 (1977). Of course, depending on the circumstances, the state may be able to
bear its burden of establishing a compelling interest and a suitably tailored means/ends fit.
82. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83. 113 S. Ct. at 2834. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109.
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principles of group and kinship, which bear a common intellectual
provenance with some undergirding principles of federalism.
Given the national commitment to establishing strict limits on
the use of race by state governments and the doctrinal principle of
racial reciprocity, the majority in Shaw seems to have had the better
of the argument. But for our purposes, the correctness or incorrect-
ness of Shaw is of less significance than the basis of the analytical
divergence-the tension between the competing paradigms-reflected
in the division on the Court in that case. Thus, while the principles
underlying federalism have much in common with civil rights para-
digms, Shaw demonstrates that there are also important tensions
that must be confronted.
C. Federalism and Civil Rights: Similar and Dissimilar Principles
In summary, then, federalism bears certain similarities to
principles underlying civil rights protections, but federalism can also
endanger the civil rights of minorities within the localized commu-
nity. Those in the local community seek local control as a means of
overcoming the persistent submersion of their interests in the na-
tional context. Minorities in local communities, on the other hand,
confront the same kinds of risks of submersion of their political inter-
ests, but at the hands of ascendant local factions. Modern civil rights
groups in the United States historically have sought to overcome the
submersion of minority interests within the state and local commu-
nity, where race discrimination has been endemic, by resort to na-
tional political institutions.
This form of national protection of civil rights is a fundamental
component of the successful federalism deal. We cannot have local
autonomy without some form of national protection for minorities
within those autonomous areas. For example, the Bosnian Serbs and
the Croats within Bosnia were quite content to live as minorities
within Bosnia when Bosnia was part of the nation-state of Yugoslavia.
When Bosnia seceded and formed its own independent state-that is,
when it exercised self-determination and established sovereign inde-
pendence-those ethnic and religious groups were quite unwilling to
remain as minorities within an independent Bosnia. The absence of
recourse to protection from a nation-state, with the possibility of
forming coalitions with those of similar interests in Yugoslavia be-
yond the Bosnian frontier, raised an unacceptable risk of subjugation.
Bloodshed developed in the absence of assurances from national
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Yugoslavian institutions of civil rights protection for the minorities
within Bosnia.
Thus, the push for national civil rights protections for localized
minorities is analogous to the thrust for federalism itself. Federalism
allows geographically defined groups to have self-rule even when their
political tastes diverge from those of the nation's majority. The civil
rights paradigm limits state power to submerge political interests of
minorities in a local area on a persistent and a pervasive basis. This
provides a form of liberation from potential oppression by local ma-
jorities. In this sense the federalism paradigm and the civil rights
paradigm are not only similar in objective but also complementary in
that the civil rights model provides protection against the risk of
oppression from local ascendant factions. However, the civil rights
supervisory role of the national government, a part of the federalism
deal, contains within it a threat to the legal foundation of federal-
ism-the legal seeds of federalism's own self-destruction.
IV. THE THREAT TO FEDERALISM FROM EXPANDING FEDERAL POWER
The federalism deal, as I call it, empowers local communities,
but it also constrains local power regarding civil rights by the superior
authority of the federal government and national political institu-
tions. Because of the implications for the expansion of federal power,
this protection of civil rights by the national government can under-
mine the legal and political foundation of federalism. The scope of
federal authority is broadened, formally (in a legal/constitutional
sense) and informally (in a political/cultural sense), so that the federal
government can serve as a civil rights ombudsman. That expanded
national authority, while necessary to effectuate the federalism deal,
is difficult to cabin and can threaten the constitutional and political
underpinnings of federalism.
Local .empowerment within the American tradition has been
defined as the absence of federal power in certain areas. This is our
constitutional model. Whereas states are assumed to have general
police powers without specific authorization, the federal government
has limited, constitutionally enumerated powers.8 The process of
84. Local governments, like the federal government, have traditionally been viewed as
possessing limited power. In the absence of specific authorization, local governments are
typically viewed as without power to act. See Chester J. Antieau, 1 Local Government Law:
Municipal Corporation Law § 2.00 (Matthew Bender, 1993). See generally Gerald E. Frug, The
City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1062-67 (1980).
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determining whether the federal government may enact legislation
requires, at least as a formal matter, that the first analytical question
be whether the federal government has a constitutional source of
authority for the legislation. The federal government does not have
inherent powers; its authority extends only to those powers constitu-
tionally conferred. The states are the sources of inherent residual
power not conferred on the national government. The Tenth
Amendment 85 reminds us of that "truism.''86
Because, from a constitutional perspective, local empowerment
is defined by the absence of national authority, the expansion of the
scope of federal authority results in the erosion of. the legal protection
for local spheres of power. If the national gpvernment gets into the
habit of intervening aggressively to fulfill the civil rights part of the
federalism deal, the scope of national authority expands and en-
croaches on the local sphere. This is particularly true if the source of
authority for federal intervention is not limited to the civil rights
arena but instead derives from broader, more generic sources of na-
tional power.
The primary constitutional source of authority for expanding
federal power has been the Commerce Clause.87 The Civil Rights Act
of 1964,88 for example, was justified and upheld by the Supreme Court
on the basis of the federal government's power to regulate interstate
commerce.89 Although there was some dispute about the appropriate
constitutional grounding for this major legislative protection of civil
rights,90 advocates viewed the Commerce Clause as the safer doctrinal
foundation.91 The cases that upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 vin-
dicated that pragmatic judgment,92 building doctrinally on earlier
decisions that justified expanding federal power over social welfare
85. The Tenth Amendment reads: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. Const., Amend. X.
86. In United States u. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), the Supreme Court stated that
the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered." See also New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-18 (1992).
87. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580, 581-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
89. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 300-04.
90. For a discussion of this issue, see Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law at 147-51
(Foundation, 12th ed. 1991).
91. Id. at 149 (quoting Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's testimony before the Senate
Committee on Commerce that use of the Commerce Clause would make the law "clearly
constitutional").
92. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 300-
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legislation such as labor relations. 93 The use of the broad commerce
power as the engine of expansion of federal authority-in civil rights,
social welfare, and elsewhere-meant that the scope of federal author-
ity was broadened generically, not just in carefully delimited or cir-
cumscribed areas. The constitutional consequence has been a much
expanded across-the-board federal role that is relatively uncon-
strained.9 4
The pivotal doctrinal shifts that allowed expansion of federal
power under the Commerce Clause were the demise of two doc-
trines-dual federalism, and the requirement that federal power
under the Commerce Clause be directly related to interstate com-
merce in a qualitative (and not just a quantitative) sense.
The dual federalism model assumes that there are non-over-
lapping spheres of state and federal power. Either a subject matter is
within the state sphere because interstate commerce is not involved,
or it is within the federal sphere because of its interstate commerce
character. Under the dual federalism approach, every expansion of
federal power came at the direct expense of state regulatory or taxing
authority. This doctrine represented the classical zero sum situation,
as far as federal/state power was concerned.95
Under the dual federalism regime, the Supreme Court was
quite careful in determining whether federal power under the
Commerce Clause existed. As the Court often pointed out, the poten-
tial loss of state authority provided an important institutional coun-
terweight to the expansion of federal power.96 Determining that the
federal government had power to set labor standards, for example,
93. See, for example, Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor
Relations Act).
94. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528; but see New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408.
95. The analysis in the cases specifically acknowledged that the expansion of federal
power under the Commerce Clause would be at the expense of the states and to the preclusion
of the states' exercise of authority over the subject matter. See, for example, Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (stating that "the production of articles, intended for
interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.... If it were otherwise, all manufacture
intended for interstate shipment would be brought under federal control to the practical exclu-
sion of the authority of the States") (emphasis added).
96. See, for example, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1895) (holding
that a broad construction of federal authority under the Commerce Clause would give Congress
vast power "to the exclusion of the States.... The power being vested in Congress and denied
to the States, it would follow as an inevitable result that the duty would devolve on Congress to
regulate all of these delicate, multiform and vital interests-interests which in their nature are
and must be local in all the details of their successful management" (quoting Kidd v. Pearson,
128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888) (upholding state prohibition on manufacture of intoxicating liquors be-
cause lack of state regulatory authority would mean exclusive federal regulatory power)).
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meant that the states had no such power.9 7 The power of the federal
government to regulate or tax liquor would foreclose state authority in
that area.9 8 Politically and institutionally, the expanding role of the
federal government could only be achieved at the direct expense of
state authority. As a consequence, the Supreme Court involved itself
deeply-it ultimately concluded too deeply99-in determining whether
the Commerce Clause provided an appropriate source of constitu-
tional authority for federal legislation under review.
As part of its attempt to develop tools for exploring and deline-
ating boundaries along the borderland of federal and state power, the
Court distinguished between "direct" and "indirect" regulation of
interstate commerce. The "direct" regulation concept was logical and
qualitative in character, unaffected by practical consequences or mat-
ters of degree. Perhaps the most explicit statement of this position
came in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,100 in which the Court rejected fed-
eral authority to regulate wages and hours of employment in the area
of mining and production. Employment relationships in the produc-
tion market were local matters, subject to state and local regulation.
Federal authority existed only if there were some "direct" relation to
interstate commerce. And the test of directness was logical or quali-
tative in scope. If mining or producing one ton of coal was local in
character, and therefore beyond the scope of federal power under the
Commerce Clause, increasing the volume of the mining or production
involved did not change its character.1°1
When the analysis in Carter Coal, decided in 1936, was repu-
diated the very next year,10 2 the Supreme Court dramatically modified
Commerce Clause analysis to allow for consideration of the practical
economic effect of an activity on interstate commerce.10 3 Quantitative
97. See, for example, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
98. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21.
99. See, for example, Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-17; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-47.
100. 298 U.S. 238.
101. The Court stated:
If the production by one man of a single ton of coal intended for interstate sale and
shipment, and actually so sold and shipped, affects interstate commerce indirectly, the
effect does not become direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of
men employed, or adding to the expense or complexities of the business, or by all
combined.... [Tihe matter of degree has no bearing upon the question here, since that
question is not-What is the extent of the local activity or condition, or the extent of the
effect produced upon interstate commerce? but-What is the relation between the
activity or condition and the effect?
Carter, 298 U.S. at 308.
102. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37.
103. Three competing strands of Commerce Clause analysis co-existed over a period of
years: See, for example, E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13-18 and Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 299-304
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considerations were no longer analytically irrelevant, and the courts
would show great (and eventually total)14 deference to political judg-
ments regarding such effects. The direct/indirect distinction for de-
termining the scope of federal Commerce Clause authority disap-
peared.-'
By 1941, the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby0 6 also
had definitively and decisively renounced the principles of dual feder-
alism. 10 7 With his famous remark that the Tenth Amendment is "but
a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered,'10
Justice Stone drained the Tenth Amendment of independent force as
an affirmative limitation on federal power. 0 9 In place of dual federal-
ism, modern Commerce Clause doctrine has substituted a concurrent
jurisdiction paradigm. At least with regard to private activity,110 the
federal government has seemingly limitless Commerce Clause author-
ity to regulate irrespective of objective. Provided that no other consti-
tutional limitations are breached, federal power is plenary, and social
welfare objectives unrelated to interstate commerce can be achieved
through use of the federal government's Commerce Clause power.,'
(using qualitative approach focusing on direct vs. indirect effects on interstate commerce);
Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 350-52 (1914) (The Shreveport
Rate Case) (using practical economic effect on commerce approach); Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495, 518-20 (1922) (using stream of commerce approach).
104. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
105. The direct/indirect distinction retains some vitality in the negative commerce clause
area, when the issue is the validity of state law in the absence of federal legislation. See note
116.
106. 312 U.S. 100.
107. See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1
(1950).
108. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
109. After a brief revival, see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 883 (1976), the
Tenth Amendment was re-interred in Garcia. The status of the Tenth Amendment as an
independent, affirmative limitation on the scope of federal power is a bit unclear after the
Supreme Court's decision in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408. Because that case
involved a federal statute that operated directly on a state as a state, the Court was able to
make its decision on absence-of-authority grounds, without having to determine whether to
revive the Tenth Amendment as an independent restraint on the scope of federal power when
federal power would otherwise be authorized under the Commerce Clause. See notes 179-97
and accompanying text. Despite the intimation in New York that there may yet be life in the
Tenth Amendment, it is clear that the dual federalism regime remains deeply buried-at least
beyond the question of federal power to operate coercively on states as states.
110. This is the import of Garcia. The Supreme Court's decision in New York holds that
there are limits on the scope of federal power when the federal government acts coercively on
the states as states. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2434-35. Intimations in New York
suggest that some limitations on federal power outside of the area of coercive legislation on
states as states might be reestablished. That would require some modification of Garcia, a
result advocated and foretold in the Garcia dissents.
111. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 (stating that "[t]he motive and purpose of a regulation of
interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the
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Under the concurrent jurisdiction paradigm, states may act
under their police power even on matters that affect interstate com-
merce. In this sense, state regulatory power sometimes may be en-
hanced as compared with the dual federalism approach; areas that
previously might have been reserved to the federal government under
dual federalism can, under concurrent jurisdiction, be subjects of
state regulation.
Two types of limitations on state power exist under the modern
concurrent jurisdiction model of Commerce Clause analysis. First,
state law that conflicts with or is preempted by federal law must
yield 12 under the supremacy clause."1 Second, in the absence of fed-
eral legislation, state legislation that discriminates against1 or un-
duly burdens 15 interstate commerce"16 violates the "negative" or
"dormant" Commerce Clause.
Institutionally, the demise of dual federalism and its replace-
ment with a concurrent jurisdiction model of federal/state relations
has meant that federal power could expand without automatically and
necessarily restricting the scope of state power. Expansion of federal
power no longer means reduction of state regulatory authority be-
cause federal/state relationships do not constitute a zero-sum situ-
ation. Predictably, the easing of that built-in institutional restraint
has allowed the Supreme Court to legitimize expanded federal power
under the Commerce Clause without fear for the direct and automatic
erosion of state regulatory and taxing power.
Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control .... Whatever
their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional
prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause.").
Accord Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241 (upholding constitutionality under commerce clause
of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (same). Darby adopted the
plenary power approach that had led the Court to uphold the federal ban on importing, mailing,
or interstate transporting of lottery tickets. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). For
cases that condemned the exercise of federal power to achieve non-commerce-clause-related
police power objectives, see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238.
112. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
113. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
114. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617(1978).
115. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
116. The distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce, no longer
significant in determining the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause, still retains
vitality in analyzing the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause on state power. See
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (holding
that a state's direct regulation of interstate commerce violates the Commerce Clause without
balancing local interests against national interests as required by Pike, 397 U.S. 137). Accord
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 n.12 (1992).
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Further, the demise of the Tenth Amendment as an independ-
ent, affirmative limitation on federal power-at least outside the
realm of direct, coercive regulation on states as states-has left the
task of limiting federal power to a determination that no source of
national authority exists. With the elimination of the direct/indirect
distinction and the shift from a qualitative to a quantitative standard
for deciding whether federal Commerce Clause authority can be in-
voked, it has been difficult to contain expanding national authority.
Since the only basis for restricting federal power is a finding that no
appropriate source-for example, the Commerce Clause-of national
power exists, and since the Supreme Court has declined to (or has
been unable to) develop standards in this area, there are no constitu-
tionally enforceable restrictions on the scope of federal power under
the Commerce Clause.117 Yet, constraints based upon the assumption
that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated (and
not inherent) powers, and which focus on whether a source of author-
ity exists to support federal involvement in an area, are the type of
constraints our system was designed to provide. But, as demon-
strated above, such lack-of-authority reasoning has been an ineffec-
tive constitutional limit on the expansion of national power since
1937.118
The concern over the erosion of local spheres of authority mir-
rors the debate at the time of the ratification of the Constitution over
the desirability of having a Bill of Rights. At the Constitutional
Convention, the original framers did not include a Bill of Rights in the
draft of the Constitution. Advocates of non-inclusion argued that a
Bill of Rights was not needed because the federal government, which
117. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 555-56. The exception to that statement, of course, is the
Supreme Court's holding in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2434-35, that there are
limits to the ability of the federal government to act directly and coercively on the states as
states.
118. There are a few recently decided lower court cases in the criminal area that suggest a
return to a source-of-authority analysis in finding certain federal criminal statutes beyond the
scope of federal Commerce Clause authority because the federal criminal activity had no
rational connection to interstate commerce. See, for example, United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d
1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994) (holding 1990 Gun-Free School Zones
Act unconstitutional absent nexus between interstate commerce and ban on firearms in school
zones; interstate commerce not an element of the crime and no Congressional finding of an
effect on commerce); United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 1993),
reversed and remanded, No. 93-6398, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 19221, 1994 WL 389210 (6th Cir.
July 26, 1994) (finding federal anti-hijacking statute unconstitutional, particularly as applied to
purely intrastate car theft, because it does not assert a nexus between the criminalized conduct
and interstate commerce). It will be interesting to see whether the Supreme Court uses those
cases as a vehicle for reestablishing ajudicial role in analyzing the scope of federal power under
the Commerce Clause on matters beyond the narrow band of circumstances contemplated by
New York.
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was to have only limited and delimited powers, could not violate
individual rights. No authority existed for the federal government to
undermine basic freedoms. A Bill of Rights, they argued, would be
superfluous.
The absence-of-authority argument meant not only that a Bill
of Rights would be superfluous but also that it could be harmful as
well. The failure on the part of the drafters of a Bill of Rights to
enumerate certain protections could imply that broader national
powers had been conferred than had been granted, in intent and in
fact, in the Constitution.
History, however, has shown us who was right about the de-
sirability of including a Bill of Rights in the Constitution: proponents
of the Bill of Rights were clearly correct. The scope of federal power
has been elastic and, since the pivotal year of 1937, largely unre-
strained. In the absence of the kind of affirmative limitations on
governmental power embodied in the Bill of Rights, governmental
power would be much broader still than it is now. The Bill of Rights
has been important not only as a restraint on federal power but also
as an influence in shaping the amorphous principles of "liberty" and
"due process" contained in the Fourteenth Amendment,"9 which, un-
like the Bill of Rights itself,120 applies to the states.' 2' In sum, the Bill
of Rights has been a critical component of the expanded individual
freedoms Americans enjoy, a tool for protecting individuals against
the exercise of governmental authority.
Indeed, the success of the Bill of Rights and the persistent
resort by citizens to its provisions, which explicitly limit the scope of
governmental power, suggest the use of the Bill of Rights as a para-
digm, a tool for restoring a meaningful regime of legal/constitutional
protection for federalism.
If one were writing on a clean slate-for example, drafting a
constitution for an emerging eastern European nation-one might
adopt a clearly delineated and explicitly defined set of rights or pow-
ers for states. This would be analogous to the Bill of Rights protec-
tions for individuals contained in the United States, and many other,
119. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
120. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243, 250-51 (1833).
121. By a process of selective incorporation, the Supreme Court has applied nearly all
provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states through the "liberty" term of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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constitutions. Such a provision could serve as an affirmative limita-
tion on national power in designated areas other than civil rights.122
This type of approach could reverse, in certain specified areas
(particularly those involving important local interests), the traditional
supremacy accorded to national law.123 It would establish a charter of
authority and hegemony for sub-national units of government en-
forceable in court as higher law against national encroachment.124
Such an enumerated reserved-powers model would facilitate adoption
of the traditional counter-majoritarian rights-based techniques used
for the protection of individual interests within political communities,
and adapt those techniques as tools for the structural safeguarding
and legal vindication of local political and institutional interests un-
der a regime of federalism. This would honor the federalism deal-a
delimited measure of local autonomy would be restored and legally
safeguarded, but the national interest and supremacy in assuring civil
rights would be retained.
122. The Tenth Amendment reserves powers to the states that are not conferred on the
federal government. In effect, the Tenth Amendment establishes the states as the holders of
residual, unassigned powers. To the extent that the conferred powers are interpreted so broadly
as to encompass nearly every conceivable subject of governmental interest, the residual powers
concept becomes drained of significance. The idea suggested in the text would enumerate areas
of specific state preeminence and reserve those to the states in a form of reverse supremacy
clause arrangement.
123. The Canadian Constitution provides an example. It contains a conventional national
supremacy clause: "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no
force or effect." Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, s. 52-(1). But each province has "exclusive[]"
authority to legislate "in relation to (a) exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the
province; (b) development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources
and forestry resources in the province ... ; and (c) development, conservation and management
of sites and facilities in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy." Id.
at s. 50, adding s. 92A-(1) to the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3. In contrast to
the provisions regarding provincial control over export of non-renewable natural resources,
which may be overridden by Parliamentary action, id. at s. 92A.-(2), (3), the provisions of s.
92A.-C1) grant power "exclusively" to Provincial legislatures. Section 51 provides detailed
definitions that relate to s. 50.
124. The German Constitution provides an example of an intermediate form of reserved-
powers safeguard. In areas of concurrent jurisdiction between the national and state govern-
ments, the national government has authority to legislate "to the extent that a need for regula-
tion by federal legislation exists." The Constitution then enumerates three situations in which
federal legislation is authorized: (1) where legislation by an individual state cannot be effective;
(2) where action by an individual state could "prejudice the interests" of other states or the
nation; and (3) where the "maintenance of legal or economic unity, especially the maintenance
of uniformity of living conditions" beyond the borders of a particular state "necessitates such
regulation." Grundgesetz [Constitution] Art. 72(2).
1280
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
V. How WELL Do AFFIRMATIVE PROTECTIONS FOR STATE AUTONOMY
FIT THE AMERICAN CONTEXT?
The question to be addressed in this final section is how well
this notion of affirmative political autonomy for states-a reverse
supremacy clause in certain designated and defined areas-fits the
American political landscape and constitutional context.
A. The Municipal Home Rule Example
Interestingly, there is an intellectual analogue to this concept
in the municipal home rule movement. Cities traditionally have been
considered creatures of the state, dependent on explicit delegations of
power from the state legislature in order to exercise any political
authority. Like the federal government, municipalities typically do
not possess inherent powers. Cities can exercise only authority dele-
gated to them by the state,125 and there has been a traditional rule of
strict construction of those delegations of power-that is, a canon of
construction (Dillon's Rule)126 against broad interpretations of stat-
utes that delegate authority to municipalities. 27
In response to the narrowly circumscribed powers allotted to
municipalities, reformers have sought to broaden the scope of local
authority. The home rule movement has pushed for greater munici-
pal authority, most effectively through state constitutional home rule
amendments. These provisions authorize municipalities to act on
matters of local concern without the necessity of seeking specific
statutory delegation of authority from the state legislature. In some
jurisdictions, these home rule provisions go so far as to assign
supremacy to local governments in areas of municipal concern. 128 Not
only do cities have greater authority to act on local matters, but also
their action may not be overturned by state legislative action.129
The home rule structure, in which municipalities are empow-
ered to act within a certain sphere and prevail over encroachments by
the state legislature, provides an analogue at the state/local level to
125. See Antieau, 1 Local Government Law § 2.00 (1993) (cited in note 84).
126. See McQuillin, 2 The Law of Municipal Corporations § 10.09 (Callaghan, 3d ed. 1988).
127. Id. §§ 10.18a-10.21.
128. See Antieau, 1 Local Government Law § 3.01 (1993) (cited in note 84).
129. See, for example, Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of
County Commissioners, 149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67 (1962) (invalidating a sales tax levied
pursuant to state statute by a special district as violative of exclusive local powers conferred on
home rule cities). Colorado's constitution subsequently was amended to allow for the
establishment of multi-county service authorities. Colo. Const. Art. XIV, § 17.
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the type of affirmative protection for federalism that I have discussed
above. Lessons learned from the home rule experience concerning the
allocation of authority between state and local governments would
provide an interesting and useful starting point for developing any
comparable concept of state-based reserved powers.
B. State-Protective Provisions of the United States Constitution
Further, the Constitution does contain a number of specific
state-protective provisions aimed at limiting the scope of federal
power.130 The most important example is the provision that "no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate"-an explicit deviation from the general procedures estab-
lished for amending the Constitution.3' But there are other provi-
sions of this nature as well.132 This suggests that the Framers were
sensitive to the need for certain types of specific limits on the nature
and scope of federal power, even if a particular power were generally
conferred on the federal government.m The concept of enumerated
affirmative limits on national power, with a view of protecting state
autonomy, would not be foreign to our constitutional framework.13 4
130. The Constitution also provides states protection against acts of other states. See, for
example, U.S. Const., Art. I., § 10, cl. 2 & 3. See also U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and
Credit provision); id. at § 2 (Privileges and Immunities Clause; mandatory extradition provi-
sion).
131. U.S. Const., Art. V. For a comparable provision, setting out a special state-protective
rule regarding the admission of new states, see U.S. Const., Art. IV., § 3 (stating that "no new
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be
formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress').
132. See, for example, U.S. Const., Art I., § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax
shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken"); id. at cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State); id. at cl.
6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one
State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter,
clear or pay Duties in another"). The direct tax protection of Article I, § 9, el. 4 was further
insulated from change by a provision that no amendment of that clause under Article V would
be authorized for twenty years. U.S. Const., Art. V. See note 13 (discussing the Twenty-first
Amendment).
133. For a historical analysis of federalism principles embodied in the Constitution, see
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 265 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. A poignant though noxious example of this form of affirmative delegation of authority
to states coupled with a limitation on federal power regarded the "Migration or Importation" of
slaves. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Formally, the provision empowered states to control
immigration and barred the Congress from prohibiting the states' exercise of this power for a
period of twenty years: "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight...." In practice, this provision allowed the slave states
to continue to traffic in slaves without federal interference for a period of twenty years. This
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C. The Tenth Amendment: National League of Cities and Garcia
Arguably, the Supreme Court's decision in National League of
Cities v. Usery"35 was driven by the kind of considerations addressed
above-that is, a perceived need to develop a constitutional shield
against certain types of federal intervention. The decision re-enlisted
the Tenth Amendment as a basis for re-establishing a judicially en-
forceable affirmative limitation on the scope of national power. In
National League of Cities the Supreme Court viewed the Tenth
Amendment as more than just a "truism." It served as a substantive
vehicle for developing affirmative limits on federal power even, by
assumption, in areas in which a source of federal constitutional power
existed. 15 The limiting principle, as it evolved, was that the chal-
lenged federal law regulated "States as States" and concerned
"attribute[s] of state sovereignty," and that state compliance with the
federal law would interfere with "traditional" state functions."37
The analytical framework in National League of Cities was
never used by the Supreme Court to invalidate other alleged federal
encroachments on state power. This may be, as some have argued, 38
because the very concept itself was flawed. The "traditional govern-
mental functions" formulation may not have been a sufficiently articu-
lated or informative principle of limitation. That was the view ex-
pressed by Justice Blackmun in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 39 which overruled National League of Cities. In
Garcia, Justice Blackmun, who had concurred and had provided the
necessary fifth vote in National League of Cities, rejected the
Faustian allocation of power was also protected from constitutional amendment for the same
period of time. See U.S. Const, Art. V.
135. 426 U.S. 833.
136. National League of Cities held unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to certain state and local government
employees such as police officers and fire fighters. The Court noted that the FLSA was
"undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause" and therefore generally within the
federal commerce power. 426 U.S. at 840-41. There was thus no question raised in the Court's
opinion suggesting doubt that the Act constitutionally could be applied under Congress' com-
merce power to private-sector workers. See Darby, 312 U.S 100 (upholding validity of Fair
Labor Standards Act under commerce power as applied to private-sector employees).
137. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 286-87
(1981). The Court also asserted that "t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission," even if the requirements de-
scribed in text are satisfied. Id. at 288 n.29.
138. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (U. of
Chicago, 1980). See also Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of
Cities, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1623 (1994).
139. 469 U.S. 528.
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"function' standard of National League of Cities as "unworkable!' and
as "inconsistent with established principles of federalism."140
In his concurrence in National League of Cities, Justice
Blackmun had viewed the decision as creating a balancing process in
which national and state interests were weighed.' 4' The majority
opinion of Justice Rehnquist envisioned more of a categorical ap-
proach.'42 Because National League of Cities was a major doctrinal
breakthrough, it merely announced the existence of a category and
gave it a name ("traditional governmental functions"), but did not
provide much analytical guidance in determining which state func-
tions were beyond the scope of federal power. 43 The National League
of Cities majority never persuaded the dissenters that there was a
principled basis for identifying and isolating the inner circle of state
powers that were worthy of protection against federal control." 4 The
Garcia decision, over strenuous dissents,45 abandoned the effort to
140. Id. at 531.
141. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the
Court's opinion "adopts a balancing approach...').
142. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that National
League of Cities did not apply a "balancing test" despite Justice Powell's contrary assertion in
his separate dissent).
143. In Garcia, Justice Blackmun observed that the Court in National League of Cities "did
not offer a general explanation of how a 'traditional' function is to be distinguished from a
'nontraditional' one." 469 U.S. at 530.
144. Ultimately, Justice Blackmun came around to this view. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539
(stating that "[w]e find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle" that
distinguishes traditional from nontraditional governmental functions, a distinction that is
"elusive at best").
145. Justice Powell, for example, noted that Garcia "effectively reduces the Tenth
Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause."
469 U.S. at 560. He was troubled that Congressional action under the expanded umbrella of the
Commerce Clause would "not be subject to judicial review" so that "the role of the States in the
federal system" will "depend upon the grace of elected federal officials, rather than on the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court." Id. at 560-61. "More troubling than the logical
infirmities in the Court's reasoning is the result of its holding, i.e., that federal political officials,
invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of their own power. This result
is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system." Id. at 567.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor found "scant comfort" for "those who believe our federal
system requires something more than a unitary, centralized government." Id. at 589. She
found the Garcia decision to reflect an abdication of the Court's responsibility to "reconcile the
Constitution's dual concerns for federalism and an effective commerce power." Id. at 581.
The dissents of both Justice O'Connor and Justice Rehnquist can be characterized as of"The
South will rise again" genre. See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (expressing confidence
that the National League of Cities federalism principle "Will... in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court"); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "I share
Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsi-
bMty).
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identify those state activities entitled to affirmative Tenth
Amendment protection.146
It may be that the National League of Cities formulation was
not successful in its mission of identifying an appropriate inner circle
of state power worthy of protection from federal encroachment. 147
That is, the "traditional governmental function" approach may have
been "unworkable," as the Garcia majority later held. But as with
most doctrinally path-breaking decisions, it is not unusual for the
pioneering decision itself to leave the details to subsequent develop-
ment. 48 And in at least two subsequent (pre-Garcia) cases that
reached the Supreme Court,49 the decision not to apply National
League of Cities principles to invalidate the measure under challenge
was based on the votes of the four justices who dissented in National
League of Cities, joined by Justice Blackmun.
This raises some questions about the "workability" issue. Had
the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions in EEOC v. WyomingsO and
FERC v. Mississippi,151 a greater body of case law would have existed
from which to see a traditional common law pattern of development.152
146. The Garcia majority consisted of the National League of Cities dissenters (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White) plus Justice Blackmun, who alone changed his mind
about the workability and legitimacy of the framework embraced in National League of Cities.
147. The Court in Garcia noted that it had "made little headway in defining the scope of
the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of Cities." 469 U.S. at
539.
148. See, for example, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), leaving formulation of equal
protection standard to subsequent decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (dealing with electoral ballot access issues but setting no
definitive standards). For a very recent example of this approach by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
the "takings" area, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
149. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
In both cases the federal agency had lost in the lower courts and sought Supreme Court review.
An interesting irony here is that the Reagan Administration, which professed support for the
principles of federalism embodied in National League of Cities, was in office when federal
agencies sought Supreme Court review that ultimately helped undermine the vitality of the
principles of the National League of Cities decision. In Garcia as well, the lower court had
applied National League of Cities to rule in favor of the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.
150. 460 U.S. 226 (upholding application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act to bar
involuntary retirement of a state employee pursuant to state law).
151. 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
which required state utility commissions to consider the adoption of certain policies and
required those commissions to follow certain procedures during the course of such
consideration).
152. The Garcia majority opinion seemed to recognize this point. 469 U.S. at 540 (stating
that "[Many constitutional standards involve '[undoubted] ... gray areas,'.., and, despite the
difficulties that this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally might be fair to
venture the assumption that case-by-case development would lead to a workable standard for
determining whether a particular governmental function should be immune from federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause"). In her Garcia dissent, Justice O'Connor acknowl-
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So while much of the majority opinion in Garcia is devoted to the
"workability" issue, what seems to have really changed is that Justice
Blackmun altered his view about the propriety of the analytical as-
sumptions that formed the basis of National League of Cities.153
Thus, in his opinion for the Court in Garcia, Justice Blackmun
rejected as "unsound in principle"'154 a judicial role in defining the
contours of state immunity from the reach of federal power because
such a role "disserves principles of democratic self-governance.' 15
Garcia therefore accepts the premise that, despite the remarkable
broadening of federal authority under the Commerce Clause-an area
of interpretation in which a judicial role is concededly appropri-
ate-the establishment of affirmative limits on federal power should
be left to the political process. 56 In that view, it is inappropriately
counter-majoritarian 57 to develop affirmative limitations judicially
edged the difficulty involved in "craft[ing] bright lines defining the scope of the state autonomy
protected by National League of Cities." Id. at 588-89. For the majority, the difficulty suggested
the impropriety of judicial intervention. For Justice O'Connor, "[riegardiess of the difficulty," it
was the Court's "duty," id. at 589, not to "abdicate its constitutional responsibility to oversee the
Federal Government's compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of the States."
Id. at 581.
153. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Garcia, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), in the
same year that it decided EEOC V. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). The seed for Garcia was
arguably sown in the sharp disagreement between Justice Stevens and Justice Powell in their
separate opinions in EEOC. In his EEOC concurrence, Justice Stevens expressed his view that
the Tenth Amendment does not "affordl any support" for a 'Judicially constructed limitation on
the scope of the federal power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause." 460 U.S. at 248.
Justice Stevens asserted that National League of Cities was "inconsistent with the central
purpose of the Constitution itself," a "modern embodiment of the spirit of the Articles of
Confederation," and was therefore "incorrectly decided." Id. at 249-50. He urged the "prompt
rejection" of National League of Cities, which he characterized as "not entitled to the deference
that the doctrine of stare decisis ordinarily commands." Id.
In response to Justice Stevens' concurrence, Justice Powell "record[ed] a personal dissent
from Justice Stevens' novel view of our Nation's history." Id. at 265. Justice Powell emphasized
that "even today federalism is not... utterly subservient" to the expanding scope of federal
power under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 266. He viewed "the power to determine the terms
and conditions of employment for the officers and employees who constitute a State's govern-
ment" to be "as sovereign a power as any that a State possesses, and ... far removed from the
original concerns of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 269 n.5. Justice Powell was alarmed that
Justice Stevens' position "recognize[d] no limitation on the ability of Congress to override state
sovereignty in exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 275.
154. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
155. Id. at 547.
156. Justice O'Connor's Garcia dissent emphasized the effect of a broadened interpretation
of the federal commerce power on the scope of state authority. For Justice O'Connor, the
expanded federal commerce power means that "Congress can now supplant the States from the
significant sphere of activities envisioned for them by the Framers." Id. at 584. Justice
O'Connor argued that the Court had an obligation to "reconcile" the "conflict" between the dual
constitutional values of "federalism and the effectiveness of the commerce power." Id. at 589.
157. Justice Blackmun relied on the work of Professors Jesse Choper and Herbert Wechsler
in reaching this conclusion. See generally Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process (cited in note 138); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
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under the Tenth Amendment because "[any rule of state immunity
that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of gov-
ernmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones
it dislikes." 58
The majority opinion in Garcia seemed to close the door on the
development of judicially-created affirmative limitations on federal
power under the Tenth Amendment. But the passion of the dissents,
and their strong belief that affirmative restrictions on federal power
were needed to provide a shield for states from expanding and en-
croaching federal power, were evident. While the language of Garcia
seemed definitive, the closeness of the vote and the strength of the
views expressed in the dissents suggested that the majority's judicial
withdrawal from the field of Tenth Amendment federalism would not
be the last word. Garcia did not seem like a stable precedent, and
predictably it has not been as Justices Souter and Thomas have joined
the Court.
D. The Tenth Amendment Post-Garcia
In the post-Garcia period, the members of the Supreme Court
unhappy with Garcia's doctrinal approach have developed two differ-
ent strategies in response. These strategies are reflected first in
Gregory v. Ashcroft,59 and then in New York v. United States.160
Gregory involved the question whether the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")161 barred Missouri's
mandatory retirement provision for state judges. Resolution of the
case called for determining whether state judges were "employees"
covered by the ADEA. In 1974, Congress extended coverage under the
ADEA to include states as employers.162 At the same time, the
definition of "employee" was changed to exclude appointed public
officials "on the policymaking level."'' 3 The issue was whether, as a
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
543 (1954).
158. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
159. 501 U.S. 452.
160. 112 S. Ct. 2408.
161. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, codified as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
162. Pub. L. 93-259, § 28(a), 88 Stat. 74, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1988).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
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matter of statutory interpretation, state judges were appointees "on
the policymaking level. '164
In introductory background to its analysis, the Court observed
that, under the Tenth Amendment, "States . . . retain substantial
sovereign authority under our constitutional system.165 Preservation
of federalism results in mutual checks on misuse of authority by both
federal and state governments. "In the tension between federal and
state power lies the promise of liberty."'166
To play its role in the federalism balance, state power must be
"credible."' 67 Because of expansive interpretations of federal power
and the supremacy of federal law, "Congress may legislate in areas
traditionally regulated by the States."'168 Because defining the qualifi-
cations of state public officials is a "decision of the most fundamental
sort for a sovereign entity, . . . Congressional interference with this
decision ... would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers.'"169
The Court's approach to preserving a certain measure of state
authority in Gregory was to adopt a "plain statement" rule of statu-
tory construction.17 If Garcia leaves federalism issues to the political
process, then the Court in Gregory found it appropriate that major
intrusions on state authority should be given effect only when the
Court is "absolutely certain that Congress intended" such an out-
come.17' The insistence on a "clear statement" assures that, with re-
spect to "legislation affecting the federal balance," the Congress "has
in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters" of
federalism involved.7 2 That is, if the federal government seeks to
overturn local autonomy, it must express its intent to do so explicitly.
Congress cannot escape political accountability by hiding its acts in
164. A related but distinct issue under the 1974 ADEA amendments was adjudicated in
EEOC v. Wyoming. EEOC did not involve a matter of statutory interpretation but rather the
question of whether Congress had authority under the Tenth Amendment as construed in
National League of Cities to apply the ADEA to state employees generally.
165. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457.
166. Id. at 459.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 460
169. Id. This is a theme developed by the dissenters in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 254
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "defining the qualifications of employees is an essential
of sovereignty"); id. at 269 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "the power to determine the
terms and conditions of employment for the officers and employees who constitute a State's
government ... is as sovereign a power as any that a State possesses...
170. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61,464.
171. Id. at 464.
172. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971), quoted in Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989), quoted in Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
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the political process, and dumping the burden on the courts to act
interstitially, thereby indirectly eroding state authority.173
The decision in Gregory based its approach on a series of
precedents from areas that reflect on sensitive federalism issues. For
example, in the preemption context, the federal intent to preempt
state authority in areas of traditional state power will be inferred only
when there is a "clear and manifest" purpose expressed.174 Similarly,
in the area of Eleventh Amendment federalism jurisprudence, the
Court has allowed federal abrogation of state powers but only if con-
gressional intent is made "unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."'175 The Court has applied the same "clear statement" doc-
trine in other comparable federal-state areas as well.176
In Gregory, the Court found that "[i]t is at least ambiguous
whether a state judge is an 'appointee on the policymaking level."' 77
As a result, the Court held that the ADEA did not apply to Missouri's
mandatory retirement policy for state judges.
The Gregory "clear statement" approach provides an important
tool for protecting state authority by requiring Congress to address
the political issue of federalism unambigously. 78 The Gregory analy-
sis concentrates on whether the federal government has sought to
exercise the broad powers it has. Its sensitivity to federalism con-
cerns is expressed by requiring that the federal government act in a
politically accountable manner in using its broad constitutional
authority. It does not, however, attempt to establish an affirmative
limitation on the scope of federal power.
173. Compare with James F. Blumstein, Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill-Burton
Act as a Case Study, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1227, 1233-38, 1256-60 (1984) (discussing the courts'
assumed "interstitial function" in enforcing "generally vague and precatory aspirational lan-
guage" and the important restraining influence and maintenance of accountability from a "clear
statement" principle of statutory construction).
174. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
175. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). See also Pennhurst State
Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
176. This principle has been applied to determining whether the state is a "person" for
purposes of the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)), to situations in which the federal government is purported to
have imposed substantial financial obligations on states (Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)), in construing the scope of coverage of federal criminal
legislation (United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)), and in construing the application of
the antitrust laws to anticompetitive conduct by the state as well as private anticompetitive
conduct approved by a state (Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
177. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
178. Compare with Blumstein, 69 Iowa L. Rev. at 1237 (cited in note 173) (discussing the
importance of setting an item on the political agenda).
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In that sense, the Court's approach in New York v. United
States179 is a more direct, albeit delicate, challenge to the Tenth
Amendment analysis of Garcia. New York dealt with the constitu-
tionality of certain provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985.180 The statute's "take title" provision
required a state in which low-level radioactive waste was generated to
"take title" and possession of such waste if the state had not provided
for the proper disposal of that waste by a specified date. New York
challenged the validity of that provision 81 under the Tenth
Amendment.
The Court in New York finessed the question of the role of the
Tenth Amendment as a restraint on federal power. To do otherwise
would have necessitated a direct reevaluation of the judicial nonin-
volvement principles of Garcia. Instead, in reinvigorating federalism
principles, New York stressed the different factual contexts in which
the cases arose.
The difference in context, which the dissent thought quite
irrelevant to the federalism/constitutional principles at issue,12
stressed the distinction "between a federal statute's regulation of
States and private parties for general purposes, as opposed to a regu-
lation solely on the activities of States.' 83 This difference allowed the
Court to downplay the role of the Tenth Amendment as an aff mative
limitation on the federal commerce power.
In the context of a case like Garcia, where the Fair Labor
Standards Act applies uniformly to employees in the private as well
as the public sectors, the general federal commerce power is conceded.
The analytical issue is whether some independent and affirmative
limitation on federal power exists so that Congress' general commerce
power is circumscribed as applied to public sector employees. Garcia
expressly held that the Tenth Amendment embraces no such principle
of affirmative limitation.
In New York, by contrast, there was no need to develop the
Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limitation on the federal com-
merce power. Because the federal statute acted only on the
state-requiring the state to take title to low-level radioactive waste if
179. 112 S. Ct. 2408.
180. Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b et. seq. (1988).
181. Two other provisions of the statute were at issue but their validity was upheld. For a
description of those provisions, see New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2416.
182. See id. at 2441 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding the
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the state did not provide for suitable disposal-there was no need to
concede the general federal commerce power. As a result, the issue
could be framed as an absence-of-federal-power question rather thai
as an affirmative-limitation-on-federal-power matter. In that sense,
the analytical framework of Garcia could be left intact while the
Court developed principles of Tenth Amendment federalism that were
nonetheless at odds with the prevailing normative view in Garcia.
Writing for the New York majority, Justice O'Connor noted
that federal/state power allocation questions can be "Viewed in either
of two ways."'1 4 They can be framed in terms of source of federal
authority-that is, "whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one
of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution."185
In the alternative, these issues can be framed in terms of federal
encroachment on affirmative limitations placed on otherwise appro-
priate federal legislation-that is, "whether an Act of Congress in-
vades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment."186
What was appealing about the factual context of New York was
that the Court did not have to confront directly the Garcia issue con-
cerning the role of the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limitation
on federal power. Rather, as Justice O'Connor aptly noted, "[i]n a
case like this one, involving the division of authority between federal
and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each
other."'187 The reason is straightforward: "[i]f a power is delegated to
Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly dis-
claims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress."188 Thus, it made no difference in New York "Whether one
view[ed] the question at issue.., as one of ascertaining the limits of
the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative
provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sover-
184. Id. at 2417.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2417.
187. Id.
188. Id. This power allocation paradigm essentially resurrects the doctrine of dual federal-
ism in the narrow circumstance of direct federal regulation of states as states. That is, power
allocation under this model is a zero-sum situation; either federal power exists or state power
prevails. See notes 95-99 and accompanying text. The Court in New York made it clear that
such a categorical approach was being adopted. In areas reserved to the states, federal power
does not exist "[n]o matter how powerful the federal interest involved.... ." Id. at 2429. There
is no balancing, rather, "the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require
the States to regulate." Id.
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eignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.189 As a
result, the Court in New York could shuffle around the thorny ques-
tion of what to do about Garcia.190
Nevertheless, the New York majority laid down some impor-
tant doctrinal markers. It analogized the Tenth Amendment to the
First Amendment, a classic Bill-of-Rights limitation on otherwise
exercisable governmental power. 191 The limiting principles of the
Tenth Amendment are "not derived from the text. . ., which... is
essentially a tautology." Instead, the Tenth Amendment signals that
the Constitution reserves certain powers to the states and that federal
power "is subject to" these limits.192
The determinative limit in New York was that "Congress may
not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program."' '93 The federal government legitimately can induce state
responsiveness to federal initiatives by use of the spending power. 94
Through a program of "cooperative federalism," Congress can provide
states with a choice--'regulat[e] ... according to federal standards or
hav[el state law pre-empted by federal regulation."'195 But the federal
government may not coerce states to implement federal directives.
Under the Constitution, Congress can "exercise its legislative author-
ity directly over individuals rather than over States."' Thus, even in
areas of authority delegated by the Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment, the federal government "lacks the power directly to compel
the States to require or prohibit [certain] acts."197 The federal "take
189. Id. at 2419.
190. The Court observed that cases such as Garcia "concerned the authority of Congress to
subject state governments to generally applicable laws." New York, instead, "concern[ed] the
circumstances under which Congress may use the States as implements of regulation; that is,
whether Congress may direct... the States to regulate in a particular field or in a particular
way." New York did not require the Court "to apply or revisit the holdings of any of these cases,
as this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable
to private parties." Id. at 2420.
191. "[U]nder the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in inter-
state commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress...." Id. at 2418.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2420 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
194. Id. at 2423. See, for example, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
195. 112 S. Ct. at 2424. See, for example, Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288-89.
196. 112 S. Ct. at 2422.
197. Id. at 2423. The Court stressed political accountability as a rationale to support its
anti-commandeering principle of limitation. If the federal government can require state officials
to implement federal policies or programs, then federal officials can avoid the political account-
ability that goes with proper identification of the parties responsible for a particular program:
[Where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
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title" provision at issue in New York was deemed coercive because it
offered the states no effective, constitutionally permissible choice. 198
Of course, the issues avoided in New York go to the heart of the
question of whether the Tenth Amendment can serve as a source of
affirmative limitation on federal power. Formally, at least, New York
can be interpreted as a lack-of-authority case.199 But it is clear that
the reason that no federal authority existed is that the Tenth
Amendment "restrains the power of Congress."200 Clearly, the federal-
ism principles embraced by the Court in New York were, at a mini-
mum, critical in leading to the conclusion that no source of fedefal
authority existed to impose the "take title" provision on the states.
Whether such a source-of-authority approach can be a stable basis for
limiting federal power is unclear.
Past experience suggests that source-of-authority limits tend
to fall as problems develop that are perceived as warranting national
attention.20' On the other hand, as the experience with the Bill of
Rights has indicated, the establishment of affirmative limitations on
federal power is more likely to result in actual, longstanding re-
straints on federal authority in areas of peculiar state concern. The
fair question is whether the Tenth Amendment, by itself or linked
with some other structural theory, is really up to the task of carving
out, on a principled basis, a set of enforceable protections for state
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their de-
cision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state of-
ficials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not
pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id. at 2424.
The Court relied on two scholarly works for this proposition. See Deborah J. Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
61-62 (1988); D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577, 639-65 (1985).
198. The states had a "choice' of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating accord-
ing to the instructions of Congress." Either "choice" was impermissibly coercive because it
would '"commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and
would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between
federal and state governments." As the Court held, a "choice between two unconstitutionally
coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all." 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
199. In its statement of holding, the Court carefully maintained its agnosticism on the
question of lack-of-a-source analysis or intrusion-on-an-afrn-mative-limitation mode of analysis.
"Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress' enumerated powers, or as
infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is
inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution." Id.
at 2429.
200. Id. at 2418.
201. This point was made by the New York dissent, which cited the "crisis of national pro-
portions in the disposal of low-level radioactive waste." Justice White referred to the majority's
analysis as a "civics lecture" that he found to have a "decidedly hollow ring at a time when
action, rather than rhetoric, is needed to solve a national problem." Id. at 2444.
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interests. While New York may rightly be seen as a transitional case,
the anti-commandeering principle that it establishes touches only a
narrow category of cases. Ultimately, the Court will have to decide
whether New York is a first step toward substantial revision or over-
ruling of Garcia, or whether it is just a relatively narrow exception to
Garcia's broad principles. 202
In a real sense, the debate about source-of-authority analysis
versus affirmative-limitation analysis mirrors the debate surrounding
adoption of the Bill of Rights. Advocates of stronger judicially-en-
forced protections of state autonomy interests are embracing a rights-
oriented paradigm as a vehicle for protecting the political hegemony
of states in certain circumscribed areas. Opponents of such a judicial
role, such as Justice Stevens, view such a rights-oriented stance as
unacceptably undemocratic, requiring the courts to make political
judgments at the margin regarding the allocation of power.
Ultimately, if the "workability" issue can be overcome, the issue may
come down to a determination of whether federalism values are wor-
thy of constitutionally enforceable status because of their important
similarities to civil rights principles, or whether their particularistic,
ascriptive, and non-universalistic characteristics suggest leaving state
autonomy to the vagaries of the national political process.
E. McCarran-Ferguson and Parker v. Brown
In this final subsection, I will briefly address two nonconstitu-
tional doctrines, alluded to in Part I,203 that extend protection for state
authority in a somewhat different manner from constitutional
reinvigoration of the Tenth Amendment. They are concepts that have
affirmatively empowered states vis-A-vis the federal government,
embracing a form of the affirmative-limitation-of-federal-power model
described earlier. One doctrine is explicitly statutory, and the other
uses principles of common law to establish a gloss on the
interpretation of a federal statute.
202. Justice White's critique, in dissent, suggests that the state's interests in autonomy are
not lessened just because the federal intrusion on state prerogatives is imposed on private
parties as well. "An incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally accept-
able if the federal statute that 'commands' specific action also applies to private parties. The
alleged diminution in state authority over its own affairs is not any less because the federal
mandate restricts the activities of private parties." Id. at 2441. That, of course, was the posi-
tion of the Garcia dissenters.
203. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
1294 [Vol. 47:1251
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
The straightforward statutory example is the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,204 a delegation to the states of federal regulatory
authority over the business of insurance. In 1944, the Supreme Court
held that the business of insurance was not purely an intrastate activ-
ity beyond the scope of the federal commerce power.205 'The decision
provoked widespread concern that the States would no longer be able
to engage in taxation and effective regulation of the insurance indus-
try."2°6 The result was prompt Congressional action designed to
authorize state taxation of, and allow state hegemony over regulation
of, the business of insurance.20 7
McCarran-Ferguson was an act of federal self-abnegation, and
it has been interpreted as such by the courts.208 The Supreme Court,
for example, has held that, under its commerce power, Congress
through the McCarran-Ferguson Act "removed all Commerce Clause
limitations on the authority of the States to regulate and tax the
business of insurance. ' 29 Because the Commerce Clause empowers
the federal government to regulate interstate commerce, the federal
government can assign that power to the states and immunize them
from the restraints of the negative Commerce Clause.210  Thus, the
negative Commerce Clause, which limits the power of states to bur-
den excessively or discriminate against interstate commerce, has no
204. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
205. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
206. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 539 (1978). To the extent that
such concern was prompted by the desire of states to treat local insurance companies on a
favored basis as compared to national or out-of-state companies, that fear was warranted. The
negative Commerce Clause prohibits that type of discrimination against interstate commerce.
See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Prudential Ins. Co., 328 U.S. at 429
(assuming state discriminatory tax against out-of-state insurance company would violate
negative Commerce Clause). However, South-Eastern Underwriters involved the application of
the federal antitrust laws to the business of insurance. Only in a dual federalism world, where
federal and state spheres are independent and non-overlapping, would such a decision
jeopardize state regulation and taxation of insurance. See notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
Under the concurrent jurisdiction approach that-had recently been adopted to govern Commerce
Clause doctrine, see, for example, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), state
regulation and taxation of the business of insurance would have been valid if non-discriminatory
against, and not unduly burdensome of, interstate commerce.
207. Congress delegated regulatory authority over the business of insurance to the states
and adopted a "clear statement" principle of statutory construction: "No Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
208. See Prudential Ins. Co., 328 U.S. at 429-30.
209. Western & Southern Life, 451 U.S. at 653.
210. For a discussion of this form of Congressional power, see William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old
Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1983).
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constraining effect on state regulatory or taxing authority regarding
the business of insurance.211
For purposes of this discussion, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
example is important because it demonstrates a paradigm of state
autonomy through statutory delegation. Congress had power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate the business of insurance but re-
allocated that power to the states in such a manner that states have
virtually212 plenary power over the taxation and regulation of the
business of insurance. Further, Congress enacted a statutory "clear
statement" rule of construction so that generally applicable federal
legislation would not apply to the business of insurance unless
Congress, in a particular statute, specifically mentioned and dealt
with the business of insurance.21s
The approach pursued under McCarran-Ferguson suggests a
model for specifically identifying areas of state primacy and protect-
ing state authority from federal intrusion by legislative enactment.
The principle upon which McCarran-Ferguson was upheld-that
Congress can allocate authority to the states in some subject area,
and can even immunize state conduct from review under the negative
Commerce Clause-could provide a vehicle for state empowerment
through such state-protective federal charters. One strategy of pro-
tecting state institutional autonomy, then, would be the enactment of
some form of federal statute that would, through the political process,
develop an agreed-upon set of areas in which the primacy of the fed-
eral government would be reassigned to the states, subject, of course,
to reclaiming by the federal government in whole or in part via a
clearly stated legislative enactment.
A second potential paradigm for developing greater institu-
tionalized state autonomy is the common law gloss on the federal
antitrust law established under the doctrine of state action immunity.
The pivotal cases are Parker v. Brown2 4 and its progeny. 215
The Supreme Court has construed the federal antitrust laws as
extending to the maximum scope of Congressional power under the
211. See Western & Southern Life, 451 U.S. at 653-55; Prudential Ins. Co., 328 U.S. at 422-
23,429-30.
212. A split Supreme Court ruled that a state's regulation of insurance was subject to the
strictures of equal protection, which, despite McCarran-Fergson, acted as an instrument of
interstate federalism to limit discriminatory treatment of out-of-state insurance companies. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). See also Western & Southern Life, 451
U.S. at 655-68.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
214. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
215. See, for example, Midcal, 445 U.S. 97.
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Commerce Clause.216 Yet, out of considerations of federalism,217 under
the Parker state action immunity doctrine, certain state and state-
approved private conduct has been held not to be prohibited by the
antitrust laws.218
Parker v. Brown involved a challenge under the antitrust
laws219 to California's Raisin Proration Program, which authorized the
state to appropriate a portion of each producer's output in order to
stabilize raisin prices. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the
state price stabilization program did not violate the federal antitrust
laws.22 0 While assuming that the program would violate the Sherman
Act "if it were organized and made effective solely" by collective action
of "private persons," the Court concluded that the Sherman Act did
not "restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by
its legislature.221
Even though Parker involved a decision by California "to sub-
stitute sales quotas and price control-the purest form of economic
regulation-for competition in the market for California raisins,1222
the Court found no antitrust violation. "Relying on principles of fed-
eralism and state sovereignty,"223 Parker announced the doctrine that
"federal antitrust laws are subject to supersession by state regulatory
programs. '224 The Sherman Act does not apply "to anticompetitive
restraints imposed by the States 'as an act of government."22-5
By allowing federal antitrust law to be "subject to supersession
by state regulatory programs," the Parker doctrine establishes a form
216. See, for example, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2
(1976).
217. The Supreme Court in Parker made clear the federalism concerns that underlay its
decision not to apply the federal antitrust laws to state conduct in the absence of a clear state-
ment of its contrary intent. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution,
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress." 317 U.S. at 351.
218. For a discussion of the federalism aspects of the Parker doctrine, see James F.
Blumstein and Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services
Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 Duke L. J. 389, 395-97,
400-03, 414-31.
219. There was also a Commerce Clause challenge, which was rejected by the Supreme
Court. Parker, 317 U.S. at 359-68.
220. Id. at 350-52.
221. Id. at 350-51.
222. See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
223. Parker, 317 U.S. at 370 (majority opinion). See also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99
(1988); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567 (1984).
224. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2176 (1992).
225. See Columbia, 499 U.S. at 370.
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of "inverse preemption."2 Although at one time a plurality of four
justices, led by Justice Stevens, argued that Parker immunity pro-
vided no defense at all for private defendants,227 that position has not
prevailed.2 2  Parker immunity can apply to private229 as well as gov-
ernmental230 defendants. As the doctrine has developed, there are two
general requirements for Parker immunity: "First, the challenged
restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the
State itself."231 The Parker state-action doctrine, therefore, provides
states with the authority to override the effect of the antitrust laws.
The federal antitrust law232 embodies a fundamental national
commitment to market-driven institutions, reflecting a "legislative
judgment that . . . competition is the best method of allocating re-
226. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. &
Econ. 23, 25 (1983). For a critique of this view of the state-action doctrine, see Einer Richard
Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 717-29 (1991).
227. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585-92 (1976) (Part II, concurred in by
White, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., not concurred in by Burger, C.J.). Justice Stevens observed that
the Supreme Court had "never sustained a claim that otherwise unlawful private conduct is
exempt from the antitrust laws because it was permitted or required by state law," id. at 600,
and argued that Parker applied only to actions against state officials in their official capacities,
id. at 591. This was a position asserted by the Solicitor General. Id. at 588-89.
228. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1988) (stating that "[alithough Parker
involved a suit against a state official, the Court subsequently recognized that Parker's federal-
ism rationale demanded that the state-action exemption also apply in certain suits against
private parties").
229. See, for example, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48 (1985).
230. "[WIhen a state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of
the State . . . and ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws." Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567 (1984). Further, a "state supreme court, when acting in a legislative
capacity, occupies the same position as that of a state legislature." Thus, "a decision of a state
supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from Sherman Act liability
as state action." Id. at 568 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977)).
231. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). The "active supervision" prong of Midcal does not apply with respect
to conduct by municipalities. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985) (stating that "the
active supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a
municipality').
The "active supervision" requirement "is designed to ensure that the state-action doctrine
will shelter only the particular anti-competitive acts of private parties that, in the judgment of
the State, actually further state regulatory policies." Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01. The "active
supervision" provision serves "essentially an evidentiary function..- ensuring that the actor is
engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy." Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46. To satisfy
the "active supervision" requirement, the state must "exercise ultimate control over the chal-
lenged anticompetitive conduct.... The mere presence of some state involvement or monitoring
does not suffice." Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101. With respect to anticompetitive conduct engaged in
by a private party, "there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather
than the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality, there is little
or no [such] danger." Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
232. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (1988).
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sources in a free market .... ,"233 The courts have been unwilling to
entertain arguments about the desirability or undesirability of pro-
competitive practices in a particular industry because the procompeti-
tive policy embraced by the Sherman Act "precludes Ujudicial] inquiry
into the question whether competition is good or bad." Antitrust
exemptions premised on the desirability of a regime of competition
are 'properly addressed to Congress."235 But even if Congress does not
act, the Parker doctrine allows states to substitute a policy of regula-
tion for competition in opposition to the principles of the Sherman Act
in specified contexts,2 provided that, under California Retail Liquor
Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 237 the states clearly articu-
late their policy and actively supervise it, thereby assuring that it is
not a sham.238
Properly executed, state action under the Parker principle has
the effect of an anti-supremacy clause, affording states primacy re-
garding regulation of their economies. 239 Despite what one believes
about the need for or propriety of some state legislation under Parker
principles, 240 Parker provides an example and establishes a paradigm
233. See National Socy of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 689. See also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105 (stating that the "argument... chal-
leng[ing] the wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to the sphere of medical care... is properly
directed to [Congress]").
236. See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105-06 (stating that "[t]o the extent that Congress has de-
clined to exempt medical peer review from the reach of the antitrust laws, peer review is
immune from antitrust scrutiny only if the State effectively has made this conduct its own").
237. 445 U.S. at 105.
238. See note 231.
239. A good example of the power that Parker provides to states derives from the move-
ment spurred by the American Hospital Association, see Frederic J. Entin, Tracey L. Fletcher
and Jeffrey M. Teske, Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate Antitrust Policy, 29
Wake Forest L. Rev. 107 (1994), to insulate cooperative activities by hospitals from the reach of
the antitrust laws. The debate about the wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to various
cooperative hospital ventures, compare id. with David L. Meyer and Charles F. (Rick) Rule,
Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 169 (1994), is taking place at the state level because of the potential applicability of Parker
immunity. Although the antitrust laws reflect national policy, the Parker doctrine strikingly
redirects focus away from the national political forum and to the state political arena. What is
being proposed and enacted in a substantial number of states, see Robert E. Bloch and Donald
M. Falk, Antitrust, Competition, and Health Care Reform, 13 Health Af. 206, 220 n.29 (1994), is
legislation in which the states are able to authorize and immunize hospital mergers, insulate
the division of markets territorially, and engage in other kinds of concerted activities that would
be subject to the antitrust law. Yet, the states under Parker are authorized to immunize this
conduct if they clearly articulate a regulatory philosophy and actively supervise that policy. For
a discussion of this state-level activity, see Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-Sanctioned
Provider Collaboration after Ticor, 62 Antitrust L. J. 409 (1994); Bloch and Falk, 13 Health Aff.
at 219-21; James F. Blumstein, Heath Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 Cornell L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 1994).
240. See generally Meyer and Rule, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 169 (cited in note 236).
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of how our law vouchsafes local autonomy--even when the exercise of
that authority is at odds with fundamental federal principles of eco-
nomic policy. Undoubtedly, the Parker principle of federalism could
be expanded beyond the area of antitrust to encompass a broader
range of policies.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have examined the objectives underlying fed-
eralism and argued that they present a viable alternative to self-de-
termination and independence for geographically-based group inter-
ests. Federalism provides political autonomy for these groups. The
secret to a successful regime of federalism-the "federalism deal"--is
a linkage of geographically-based autonomy with a national assurance
of civil rights protections for political, racial, gender-based, religious,
or ethnic groups within those quasi-autonomous regions.
As a political principle and as an institutional structure, feder-
alism decentralizes decisionmaking to promote autonomy, democracy,
and freedom. In terms of goals, therefore, principles underlying fed-
eralism have much in common with traditional principles of civil
rights. They both are tools for restraining majoritarianism, but their
modes of operation are quite different. Federalism uses majoritarian
principles at a subnational level as a means of delimiting national
majoritarian authority; it protects geographically-based group inter-
ests.
In this regard, there is also a fundamental tension between the
federalism paradigm and the civil rights paradigm. Civil rights prin-
ciples restrain majoritarianism through the use of countermajori-
tarian precepts such as the rule against discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, and gender. Consequently, while the objectives may be
complementary in many circumstances, the techniques used often will
be in considerable tension. The racial gerrymander situation is a good
example of where the paradigms lead in very different analytical
directions.
Because part of the federalism deal requires national interven-
tion to assure civil rights protections, and provides recourse for re-
gional minorities being treated unfairly in their quasi-autonomous
areas, there is a need for strong national powers. But that need often
becomes the basis for the legal/constitutional demise of institutional-
ized and enforceable limitations on the exercise of national power.
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In the United States, limits on national power were supposed
to derive from the nature of the federal government as a government
of only enumerated powers. As the scope of national authority ex-
panded, particularly with broad and flexible interpretations of the
federal commerce power, it was clear that federal power would not be
much, if at all, circumscribed by doctrines that relied on finding cer-
tain federal action beyond the scope of an enumerated power. In this
Article, I have argued that serious attempts to allocate authority to
states require a search for affirmative limits on federal power, analo-
gous to Bill-of-Rights restraints that protect individuals against par-
ticular government conduct.
Finally, I conclude that developing an affirmative limitation on
federal power may well be consistent with our constitutional and
institutional traditions. The Tenth Amendment may or may not be up
to the task of providing an affirmative restraint on national power;
the issue seemed to be settled by the Garcia case, but the subsequent
decision in New York suggests a renewed interest in doctrinally rein-
vigorating the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limit on federal
commerce power. Other techniques of limitation, such as the clear
statement approach of Gregory v. Ashcroft, are found to offer some
promise. Finally, there are the statutory and common-law examples
of the federal government empowering the states to govern jurisdic-
tionally in certain areas. Consistent with those principles, a charter
of federalism could be developed, as an act of federal self-abnegation.
As mentioned in the Introduction, such an executive order was prom-
ulgated during the Reagan-Bush years,2 1 and is still in effect.
Comparable statutory initiatives in carefully defined areas could
restore greater balance between state and federal spheres.
241. See note 1.
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